31 took place precisely in a political context of heightened tension between the highest courts of the Ecuadorian judiciary and the executive and legislative branches. This is compounded by the National Congress’s evidently arbitrary interpretation of Transitory Provision No. 25 of the 1998 Constitution in order to apply it to the justices of the Supreme Court, even though its text makes it clear that it did not apply to officials appointed prior to August 10, 1998. Thus, the external pressure, including pressure from the executive branch, the National Congress’s failure to exercise its supposed competence to terminate the functions of the Supreme Court justices over the space of two years, the activation of that supposed competence in a political context marked by pronounced tension with the judiciary, and the obvious arbitrariness of the interpretation in which the decision was based, fuel doubts about objectivity and strict compliance with the law that allow a lack of impartiality on the part of the National Congress to be inferred in the case at hand. 120. Consequently, the IACHR concludes that the State did violate the right to be judged by a competent, independent, and impartial authority, enshrined in Article 8.1 of the American Convention in relation to the obligations established in articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention, with respect to Hugo Quintana Coello, Alfredo Contreras Villavicencio, Teodoro Coello Vásquez, Santiago Andrade Ubidia, José Julio Benítez Astudillo, Armando Bermeo Castillo, Eduardo Brito Mieles, Nicolás Castro Patiño, Galo Galarza Paz, Luis Heredia Moreno, Estuardo Hurtado Larrea, Ángel Lescano Fiallo, Galo Pico Mantilla, Jorge Ramírez Álvarez, Carlos Riofrío Corral, José Vicente Troya Jaramillo, Rodrigo Varea Avilez, Jaime Velasco Dávila, Miguel Villacís Gómez, Gonzalo Zambrano Palacios, Milton Moreno Aguirre, Arturo Donoso Castellón, Ernesto Albán Gómez, Hernán Quevedo Terán, Jorge Andrade Lara, Clotario Salinas Montaño, and Armando Serrano Puig. 121. Finally, as regards the guarantees set out in Article 8.2 of the American Convention, it has been established that the termination of the Supreme Court justices was ordered after the President of the Republic had convened a special session of Congress. The call for that session was issued on December 5, 2004, and the resolution was adopted by Congress on December 8, 2004, and there is no information whatsoever to indicate that the victims were granted any possibility of defending themselves. On the contrary, the State of Ecuador acknowledged that it was not necessary to notify the Supreme Court justices of the procedure or to grant them the right of defense. The IACHR has already made clear that under the applicable international standards, all proceedings to remove judges from office must offer guarantees of due process, regardless of what name is given to the procedure under domestic law. 122. Consequently, and given the State’s express acknowledgment of the absence of procedural guarantees and the possibility of offering a defense in this case, the Commission concludes that the State of Ecuador did also violate the guarantees set out in Article 8.2 of the American Convention, in conjunction with the obligations set out in Articles 1.1 and 2 thereof, with respect to Hugo Quintana Coello, Alfredo Contreras Villavicencio, Teodoro Coello Vásquez, Santiago Andrade Ubidia, José Julio Benítez Astudillo, Armando Bermeo Castillo, Eduardo Brito Mieles, Nicolás Castro Patiño, Galo Galarza Paz, Luis Heredia Moreno, Estuardo Hurtado Larrea, Ángel Lescano Fiallo, Galo Pico Mantilla, Jorge Ramírez Álvarez, Carlos Riofrío Corral, José Vicente Troya Jaramillo, Rodrigo Varea Avilez, Jaime Velasco Dávila, Miguel Villacís Gómez, Gonzalo Zambrano Palacios, Milton Moreno Aguirre, Arturo Donoso Castellón, Ernesto Albán Gómez, Hernán Quevedo Terán, Jorge Andrade Lara, Clotario Salinas Montaño, and Armando Serrano Puig. E. The right to judicial protection (Article 25 of the American Convention) 123. Article 25 of the American Convention establishes: 1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights