68. As to cause, although Decree 348 references Decree 899, which, in its turn, included a reference to legal and constitutional provisions, those provisions relate to the appointment requirements for members of the TSE. The Commission has previously set out its position regarding the incompatibility with the Convention of the application by analogy of appointment requirements in the exercise of disciplinary authority from the point of view of the principle of judicial independence, especially when the appointment is essentially political in nature. In that regard, the Commission adds that application by analogy also violates the principle of legality. 69. That violation was reflected in the abstract and ambiguous justifications that were attributed in Decree 899 to Mr. Colindres, such as, for example, causing “widespread malaise”; “preventing the TSE from operating as it should”; not “meeting the administration's needs and requirements”; “clear lack of training and probity”; or “disobedience,” which, moreover, were unsupported by regulatory provisions establishing them as cause for disciplinary action. 70. In light of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the State violated the obligation to provide justification for decisions and the principle of legality established in Articles 8(1) and 9 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with the obligations contained in Articles 1 and 2 thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Colindres. d. The Right to a Hearing and the Right of Defense 71. The right to a hearing (Article 8(1) of the Convention) includes the right of access of all persons to the tribunal or state organ responsible for determining their rights and obligations.101 The right of defense, for its part, includes the obligation of prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him (Article 8(2)(b) of the Convention) and that he be afforded adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense (Article 8(2)(b) of the Convention). The two rights—to a hearing and defense—are interrelated, since "To provide a hearing to a person under investigation implies permitting him to defend himself adequately.”102 The right to a hearing need not necessarily be exercised orally in all proceedings; it may be exercised in writing.103 The authority in charge of the disciplinary proceeding must act in accordance with the procedure established for that purpose and allow the right of defense to be exercised.104 That right is impaired, for example, when the amount of time granted to mount a defense is not adequate for examining the case and the body of evidence.105 72. In this case, the Commission has already concluded that the absence of a regulatory framework created uncertainty with regard to the grounds for disciplinary measures and the applicable procedure. Furthermore, the special committee set up to ensure the right to a hearing is not expressly mentioned among the types of committees that the Legislative Assembly may establish under the Constitution.106 In the Commission's opinion, all of this, in addition to the violations already found, seriously 101 I/A Court H.R., Cf. Genie Lacayo Case v. Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997. Series C No. 30, par. 74, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs . Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, par. 140. 102 Thus, the Commission has held: “To provide a hearing to a person under investigation implies permitting him to defend himself adequately, with the assistance of an attorney, in knowledge of all the evidence mounted against him; to provide him with a hearing is to permit him to be present at the examination of any witnesses that testify against him, to permit him to challenge their testimony, and to cross-examine them in order to discredit their incriminating statements as contradictory or false; to provide an accused with a hearing is to give him the opportunity to deny and to detract from the documents sought to be used against him.” IACHR, Report No, 50/00, Case 11.298, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart vs. Venezuela, par. 112. 103 I/A Court H.R., Case of Apitz-Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, par. 75. 104I/A Court H.R., Case of the Constitutional Court v. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 74, pars. 73 and 74. IACHR, Report No. 30/97, Case 10.087, Merits, Gustavo Carranza (Argentina), September 30, 1997, par. 68 105I/A Court H.R., Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, pars. 81-83. According to the State, under Article 131 of the Constitution, the Legislative Assembly has the power to “appoint special committees for the investigation of matters of national interest and to adopt the agreements or recommendations that are considered [continues …] 106 17