95 exercise of the rights of all the people under its jurisdiction.130 This active protection of the right to life by the State not only involves its legislators, but the entire state instituion and those that must protect the security, being these either police forces or armed forces.131 238. Based on the aforementioned, the States must adopt the necessary measures not only to prevent and punish the deprivation of life as a consequence of criminal acts, bt also to prevent arbitrary executions by their own police force,132 situation that is made worse when there is a pattern of violations to human rights.133 The State must especially supervise that their police forces, which were attributed the use of legitimate force, respect the right to life of those under its jurisdiction.134 239. As can be concluded from the “Basic Principles of the Use of Force and Fire Arms by Law Enforcement Officials,” the state police forces may only recur to the use of lethal weapons when it is “strictly inevitable to protect a life” and when less extreme measures result ineffective.135 240. As has been stated on previous occasions, this Court acknowledges the existence of the power and even the obligation of the State to guarantee security and maintain public order, especially within the prisons, using force if necessary.136 In this sense, it has also established that by reducing the alterations to public order the State must do so in accordance with and in application of domestic legislation in seeking the satisfaction of pblic order, as long as this legislation and the actions taken when applying it adjust, at the same time, to the norms for the protection of human rights applicable to the subject.137 The state’s power is not limited; it is 130 Cfr. Case of Vargas Areco, supra note 3, para. 75; Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia), supra note 128, para. 65; and Case of the Ituango Massacres, supra note 7, para. 130. 131 Cfr. Case of Vargas Areco, supra note 3, para. 75; Case of the Ituango Massacres, supra note 7, para. 131; and Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 7, para. 120. 132 Cfr. Case of Baldeón García, supra note 21, para. 87; Caso of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 8, para. 232; and Case of Huilce Tecse, supra note 22, para. 66. 133 Cfr. Case of Baldeón García, supra note 21, para. 87; Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers, supra note 21, para. 128; and Case of Myrna Mack Chang. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 139. 134 Cfr. Case of Servellón García et al., supra note 3, para. 102; and Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia), supra note 128, para. 66. 135 Cfr. U.N., Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Fire Arms by Law Enforcement Officers, adopted by the Eight Congress of the United Nations for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Delinquents, Habana, Cuba, August 27th through September 7th, 1990, Principles 4 and 9. In the same sense, Cfr. Case of Yare I and Yare II Capital Regional Penitenciary Center. Provisional Measures, supra note 125, Fifteenth whereas, and Monagas Judicial Confinement Center (La Pica). Provisional Measures, supra note 125, Seventeenth whereas. 136 Cfr. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia), supra note 128, para. 70; Case of Neira Alegría et al. Judgment of January 19, 1995. Series C No. 20, para. 75; Case of Godínez Cruz. Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 162; Case of Yare I and Yare II Capital Regional Penitenciary Center. Provisional Measures, supra note 125, Fifteenth whereas, and Monagas Judicial Confinement Center (La Pica). Provisional Measures, supra note 125, Seventeenth whereas; and Case of Children Deprived of Liberty in the “Complexo do Tatuapé” of FEBEM. Provisional Measures. Ruling of the Court of November 30, 2005, Twelfth whereas. 137 Cfr. Case of the Caracazo. Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of August 29, 2002. Series C No. 95, para. 127; Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et