19 45. An international tribunal whose purpose is to protect human rights, such as the Inter-American Court, has its own procedures, which distinguish its proceedings from proceedings under domestic law. They are less formal and more flexible than the latter, which does not mean that the Court disregards the legal protection of and procedural balance for the parties.9 46. Also, it is necessary to bear in mind that the international protection of human rights must not be confused with criminal justice. When States appear before the Tribunal, they are not engaged in a criminal proceeding. The function of the Court is not to impose punishment on States or persons guilty of violating human rights, but rather to protect victims from such violations, declare States responsible for same internationally, when appropriate, and order said States to provide compensation for the injury caused by the acts in question.10 47. In addition to direct evidence, be it testimonial, expert or documentary, international courts, as well as domestic courts, can base their judgments on circumstantial evidence, indications and presumptions, provided same lead to sound conclusions regarding the facts. In this regard, the Court has already said that in the exercise of its jurisdictional function, and in the process of obtaining and assessing the evidence it needs to decide the cases it hears, it may, in certain circumstances, use both circumstantial evidence and indications or presumptions as a basis for its pronouncements, when consistent conclusions regarding the facts can be inferred from same. 11 48. Also, as the Court has pointed out, the criteria used by an international human rights tribunal in assessing evidence are broader, and in determining the international responsibility of a State for the violation of human rights, it has greater flexibility in assessing the evidence placed before it in connection with the pertinent facts, in accordance with the rules of logic and based on experience.12 49. In this case, the Court will weigh the value of the documents, testimony and expert opinions presented to it. 9 cfr. Castillo-Petruzzi et al. Case. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 60; CastilloPáez Case. Reparations (Art. 63.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 43, para. 38; Loayza-Tamayo Case, Reparations (Art. 63.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, para. 38; and Paniagua-Morales et al. Case. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 70. 10 cfr. Paniagua-Morales et al. Case, supra note 9, para. 71; Suárez-Rosero Case, Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 37; Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales Case. Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 136. Godínez-Cruz Case. Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 140; and Velázquez-Rodríguez Case. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 134. 11 cfr. Castillo-Petruzzi et al. Case, supra note 9, para. 62; Loayza-Tamayo Case, Reparations, supra note 9, para. 51; Paniagua-Morales et al.Case, supra note 9, para. 72; Blake Case. Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 49; and Gangaram-Panday Case. Judgment Of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 49. 12 cfr. Blake Case, supra note 11, para. 50; Castillo-Páez Case. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34, para. 39; and Loayza-Tamayo Case. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, para. 42.