224. The investigative activity of the UFI AMIA during the period 2005 to 2015 related to the clarification of the attack was reflected, essentially, in two reports signed in the years 2006 and 2009. Regarding the first of them, dated October 25, 2006, prosecutors Nisman and Martinez Burgos presented various arguments that allowed them to reach the conclusion that “the attack perpetrated against the headquarters of the AMIA was carried out by the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah, at the request of the highest authorities of the then government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and with the participation, at the local level, of Iranian diplomatic officials accredited in our country”213. 225. In the same report of October 2006, the prosecutors assured that the Renault Trafic van loaded with explosives that exploded in the AMIA building was driven by a Hezbollah militant suicide bomber of Lebanese nationality named Ibrahim Hussein Berro, who was allegedly recruited by Hezbollah,214 and later transferred to the Triple Border region between Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, from where he would have secretly entered Argentine territory with the help of supporters of that organization who resided in that area 215. 226. Consequently, the prosecutors asked Judge Canicoba Corral to order the arrest of a group of officials and former public officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran and members of Hezbollah, for them to present a testimony for the investigation, in accordance with the Argentine criminal procedural rules. In November 2007, and in the absence of judicial cooperation from the states in whose territory the accused are presumed to be residing, INTERPOL issued a red notice with respect to 6 of 8 of them216. As of the date of approval of this report, the red notices remained in force, except for the one corresponding to an accused of Lebanese nationality whose death was verified in 2008217. 227. The second report of the UFI AMIA, dated May 20, 2009, focused on formulating an accusation against an individual named Samuel Salman El Reda. This person, at the discretion of the prosecution, would have been the one who from his place of residence in the triple border area “coordinated the arrival and departure, the logistics operations, and the other activities carried out by the operational group in charge of executing the final phase of the attack”218. The intervening judge issued an international arrest warrant and INTERPOL issued a red alert that also remains in force to date219. 228. As of January 2015, the team of prosecutors heading the UFI AMIA undertook various measures, disseminated to family members and the public through a series of semi-annual management reports. According to these reports, the UFI AMIA concentrated on the task of sustaining and consolidating the accusatory hypothesis embodied in the 2006 and 2009 rulings, without discarding "the processing of other lines not necessarily consistent with that thesis”220. 229. The UFI AMIA reported in July 2016 that part of its efforts were focused on the genetic verification of the identity of Ibrahim Hussein Berro. Prosecutors indicated that for such purposes it was necessary to inspect the Judicial Morgue, carry out an inventory of the organic material that was stored there, and verify its maintenance and conservation conditions. Likewise, the prosecutors summoned the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team so that, alongside the officials of the Judicial Morgue, they would conduct “a biological expert opinion in order to obtain the DNA profile of the samples of the human remains of the victims of the attack” 221 and determine if there is any sample in deposit that corresponds to unidentified persons, including Berro. Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report p. 781. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report p. 692. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. 215 Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report pp. 699 to 706. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. 216 Annex 11. UFI AMIA Management Report July 2016. Page 7. Annex 13 to the petitioner's communication dated November 11, 2019. 217 Annex 8. UFI AMIA Management Report December 2016. Page 18. Annex 13 to the petitioner's communication dated November 11, 2019. 218 Annex 9. UFI AMIA 2009 Report p. 4. Annex 16 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. 219 Annex 8. UFI AMIA Management Report December 2016. Page 15. Annex 17 to the petitioner's communication dated November 11, 2019. 220 Annex 11. UFI AMIA Management Report July 2016. Page 6. Annex 13 to the petitioner's communication dated November 11, 2019. 221 Annex 11. UFI AMIA Management Report July 2016. Page 9. Annex 13 to the petitioner's communication dated November 11, 2019. 213 214 44