for the clarification of the facts, does not satisfy the duty of due diligence, according to the internationally recognized parameters 228. The Commission emphasizes that in complex cases such as the AMIA attack, it is necessary for the officials in charge of the investigation to incorporate an interdisciplinary approach into their work routines that includes the contribution that specialists from different scientific fields may provide229. 235. The Commission considers that the course of action followed by the UFI AMIA as of 2015 was positive with regard to the exploration of tools of forensic medicine as a way of helping to determine the historical truth of the event. The Commission is also aware that DNA amplification, purification, and extraction techniques have undergone considerable progress from the time of the attack to the present day. Notwithstanding this, the Commission observes that throughout this process the Argentine State did not provide any reason why the aforementioned scientific expert opinion was ordered and started only in March 2016, that is, almost 22 years after the events occurred. This situation constitutes, in the Commission's opinion, a breach of the State's duty to act with due diligence in the investigation of the facts. As will be pointed out in the following paragraphs, such delays become even more relevant considering the results yielded by the measure once concluded. ii) Regarding the determination of the identity of the person who would have immolated themselves in the attack 236. The TOF 3 in its judgment of October 2004 concluded that the attack on the AMIA was caused by the detonation of an explosive charge placed in the back of a Renault Trafic van230. In the report dated October 25, 2006, the UFI AMIA identified a citizen of Lebanese origin named Ibrahim Hussein Berro as the driver of the Trafic van that would have crashed in front of the AMIA. According to prosecutors, the first information that linked Berro's name to the attack was provided by a source, whose identity was kept confidential throughout the report, during an interview held in the city of Montevideo in 2001 with agents of the SIDE and the FBI. This source, identified as "a Lebanese citizen, a former militant of the terrorist group Hezbollah," assured that a person who lived near his home named Abu Mohamed Yassin had told him that "the surname of the one who played the suicide bomber in the attack to the headquarters of the AMIA was Brru.”231 237. In the subsequent pages of the report, the prosecutors mentioned a series of elements that would verify what was stated by the individual who was interviewed by SIDE agents in the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. In the first place, they recorded that the witness Abolghasem Mesbahi affirmed before the TOF 3 that the person who had immolated themselves was of Lebanese origin 232 . Secondly, the prosecutors cited in numerous sections "information provided in a timely manner by the Intelligence Secretariat”233 and information provided by a "collateral service" of the Intelligence Secretariat234, which would be incorporated into a dossier produced by the SIDE, titled "International Report” and that would greatly support the aforementioned hypothesis. UN. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Minnesota Protocol on the Investigation of Potentially Unlawful Death (2016), Revision of the UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of ExtraLegal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions. See in particular its Chapter IV.B “The process of investigation”, paras. 50 to 66. 229 United Nations. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Model Protocol for Forensic Investigation of Deaths Suspicious of Having been caused by Human Rights Violations. Of special importance for this report is: Part I Forensic Investigation on Fresh Bodies. Chapter C.6 Forensic Genetics Examination, page 33 and Part II Forensic Investigation of Decomposing or Skeletonized Bodies. Chapter B.9 Identification by means of genetic markers. 230 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter V. Pag 2434. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 231 Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report p. 694. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. 232 Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report p. 696. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. 233 Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. See, for example among many others: Pages. 698 and 699 on the identity of Abu Mohamad Yassin, “The information timely provided by the Intelligence Secretariat in which Abu Mohamad Yassin is referred to as ‘an important member of Hezbollah…’; page 702 on Berro’s trip from Lebanon to the American continent: “Another source of the Intelligence Secretariat […] affirms that ‘two or three elements departed from Lebanon – via Europe – to the Triple Border, with European passports and identities of citizens of those countries yet not Lebanese. One of them would be Hijad Hussein Brru…’; page 733; on the alleged affinity of the Berro family with terrorist groups, see page 733. (original not highlighted.) 234 Annex 5. UFI AMIA 2006 Report. Annex 12 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019.See, for example: page 699, on the presence of Ibrahim Berro in the area of the Triple Border: “a report provided by a partner service' of the Secretary of Intelligence that determined that the individual traveled from Lebanon to the area of the 'triple border a few days before the date chosen for the execution of the attack on the AMIA headquarters” (original not highlighted); On Berro’s supposed hosts in the triple border, see p. 704. 228 46