248. The IACHR understands that, in light of the results of this biological expert opinion, it is reasonable that to date there continue to be serious doubts regarding the veracity of the prosecutors’ hypothesis set out in the October 2006 report. This state of uncertainty is heightened if it is taken into account that in the aforementioned report Berro's identification was based, the Commission reiterates, on information gathered by Argentine and foreign intelligence agencies and on statements from protected witnesses, whose veracity could not be controlled or corroborated nor by the judicial authorities nor by the petitioners acting as plaintiffs in the case, since their introduction to the judicial file was not governed by the rules of testimonial evidence. (see supra para. 243). 249. The Commission considers that, in addition to the timely performance of the DNA studies outlined above, the authorities in charge of the investigation should have diligently and exhaustively adopted a series of measures in order to collect as much evidence as possible to support the version of the events recorded in the intelligence reports. This included having required to keep a documentary record of the intelligence services’ activity in order to be able to guarantee that such information could constitute evidence in the legal proceedings, or, alternatively, facilitate carrying out additional judicial proceedings245. 250. In addition to this, the Commission emphasizes that the transnational nature of terrorist crimes implies that the States have a specific duty to do everything that is reasonably within their power to encourage and ensure the international judicial cooperation of third states harboring persons or documents of interest in clarifying the facts. In the specific case, the adequate fulfillment of the duty to investigate with due diligence demands that the Argentine State to use the means within its reach to ensure that all information that is in the hands of a foreign nationals or an agency belonging to a foreign state can be incorporated into the judicial investigation currently underway246. This includes the information that said persons or organizations may have transmitted to intelligence agents belonging to the Argentine State. 251. The Commission does not have detailed information to date that allows it to establish in a concrete manner what efforts the Argentine State would be carrying out in that direction. This is despite the fact that it understands that it has made contacts with other state agencies in the framework of the investigation of the case and that expert proceedings have also been carried out with the cooperation of other states and that some extradition requests have been made regarding accused persons. In this regard, the Commission does not have up-to-date information, for example, on the initiatives and strategies promoted by the State with the aim of materializing the investigative statements of the accused Iranian nationals247. On this matter, Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, has affirmed that: “While intelligence services are ordinarily obliged to delete data that are no longer relevant to their mandate, it is important that this is not to the detriment of the work of oversight bodies or possible legal proceeding s. Information held by intelligence services may constitute evidence in legal proceedings with significant implications for the individuals concerned; the availability of such material may be important for guaranteeing due process rights. Therefore, it is good practice for intell igence services to be obliged to retain all records (including original transcripts and operational notes) in cases that may lead to legal proceedings, and that the deletion of any such information be supervised by an external institution”. United Nations. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin*. Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight*. A/HRC/14/46. May 17, 2010. Para. 38. Available at https://fas.org/irp/eprint/unhrc.pdf 246 United Nations. Security Council. Resolution 1373 (2001), art. 2.f; General Assembly of the Organization of American States. InterAmerican Convention against Terrorism. AG / RES. 1840 (XXXII-O / 02), art 4.c. The Inter-American Court has indicated that “the definition of conducts that are considered to affect transcendental values or goods of the international community, […] make it necessary to activate national and international means, instruments, and mechanisms for the effective prosecution of such co nducts and the sanction of their authors, in order to prevent them and prevent them from remaining in impunity. I/A Court H.R., Case of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 22, 2006. Series C No. 153, para. 130. 247 The Commission has been informed of the signing of a “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the issues related to the terrorist attack on the AMIA headquarters in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994 ”, signed on January 27, 2013 in the city of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Said memorandum was approved by the Argentine Congress through Law 26.843 dated February 27, 2013. The Commission does not have information regarding the process of ratification of the memorandum by the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to the information provided by the petitioners and by the representatives of the Argentine State, Law 26.843 was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Criminal Cassation Chamber in December 2015 and its clauses never had legal effect. Consequently, the Commission will refrain from evaluating it in this report. 245 49