6 decision was not subject to such an appeal. The petitioners note in this regard that in 1992 the very same composition of the Supreme Court had accepted such a request in a similar case. 14. The petitioners consider that Mr. Mohamed’s conviction violated Article 9 of the American Convention, which prohibits the imposition of ex post facto laws. They contend that the First Chamber of the National Chamber of Appeals based its conviction on violations of three provisions of the transit regulations that were issued on April 27, 1992, subsequent to the traffic accident that took place on March 16, 1992. They consider that the criminalization of conduct at the time of sentencing, when it was not illegal at the time of the facts, violates Article 9 of the American Convention. 15. The petitioners note that, when the First Chamber of the Court of Appeals rejected their special appeal, it admitted that it had made a “material error” in referring to the 1992 regulations, which had not been in force at the time of the accident. The Chamber went on, however, to indicate that the penalty imposed had been based principally on an objective duty of care under the Criminal Code. The petitioners maintain that no such crime exists under the national legal order. The petitioners emphasize that Argentine law contains no express norm indicating that a person who violates the “objective duty of care” shall be convicted and penalized, and that the legal system does not permit the application of law by analogy or in abstract. 16. The petitioners maintain that the National Chamber of Appeals applied the Criminal Code not based on a general principle, but by establishing violations of the transit regulations of 1992. The abovementioned article 84 of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the facts provided for a penalty ranging from six months to three years for any person who “through imprudence, negligence or lack of expertise in his or her art or profession, or failure to observe the regulations or duties under his or her responsibility, causes the death of another.” 17. With respect to the State’s argument that the conviction was based on Article 84 of the Criminal Code and not on retroactive application of the regulations, the petitioners argue that punishable conduct cannot be defined at the judges’ discretion, but only by regulations that integrate the criminal law provision. They add that the definition of negligent offences tends to be more or less loose, but this does not empower judges to make their own definition of offenses, and these activities are therefore regulated. In this regard, they note that the doctrine clearly distinguishes between negligent and intentional offenses. Intentional offenses always imply the violation of a primary duty of the principal norm; e.g., in homicide, it is the norm that prohibits killing. Negligent crimes, on the other hand, are the violation of another different duty before the obligation not to kill; the law prohibits other actions besides killing because they endanger the protected asset, which in this case is life. They are norms of prudence, generally contained in police regulations and others that regulate daily life. This was established in the Chamber’s judgment that cited Decree 692/92 to punish Mr. Mohamed’s conduct. The petitioners argue that using Article 84 alone to establish the offense of failure to exercise the “objective duty to care” violates the prohibition of retroactive laws established in Article 9 of the American Convention. 18. Concerning the State’s argument that Articles 37, 39, and 40 of Decree 692/92 impose the same obligations on drivers as Articles 41, 42, 47, and 49 of Decree 12.689/45, which was superseded by Law 23.181/85, the petitioners say this is not true. They say that even though some aspects may be similar, the overall legislation of both regulations is quite different. The petitioners state that despite the similarities, this does not authorize the legislator to apply them by analogy especially when this is not established in any of the judgments.1 In 01 The petitioners add that at the time of Decree 12.689 of 1945, there were no traffic lights in the city of Buenos Aires, and there were no one-way streets, as is the case Belgrano St. (which was designated one-way on December 29, 1967 and had traffic lights approved on December 10, 1996). Therefore, the principles of said