10 b. That the proceeding being conducted in the First Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court against two police officers on charges of abuse of power, violence and resisting arrest is not a criminal proceeding to ascertain who is responsible for the alleged detention and subsequent disappearance of Mr. Ernesto Rafael Castillo-Páez and, consequently, is not a remedy that must be exhausted before international protection may be sought. c. Nor is it possible to accept the Government's assertion that the petitioner had not exhausted the domestic remedies by failing to file a petition of cassation with the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees. On the contrary, the Commission considers that the petitioner had no obligation to resort to that tribunal, inasmuch as the petition of habeas corpus in favor of the alleged victim had been granted in the courts of both first and second instance. Furthermore, the remedy was ineffective owing to the fact that the Supreme Court of Justice of Peru had irregularly admitted the hearing of that petition when it overturned the judgment of the Eighth Court of Appeals upholding the lower court's decision to grant the petition of habeas corpus filed on behalf of Mr. Ernesto Rafael Castillo-Páez. It was not competent to rule on the writ of habeas corpus in view of the specific legal prohibition contained in Article 21 of Law 23.506, “habeas corpus and Amparo Law,” whereby that court could only take up, on appeal, lower court rulings that denied petitions of habeas corpus. In this case, the petition had been granted. d. That the Government's objection of inadmissibility of the Commission's application to the Court is based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; it is therefore not an objection filed in a timely manner, but rather a recapitulation of arguments that add nothing to the first objection. VI 39. The Court considers that both objections must be examined jointly, inasmuch as they are mutually supporting and are based solely on the failure to exhaust domestic remedies, in the terms of Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention and Article 37 of the Regulations of the Commission. 40. The Court wishes to state that, in connection with this matter, it has established criteria that must be taken into consideration in this case. Indeed, the generally accepted principles of international law to which the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies refers indicate, firstly, that this is a rule that may be waived, either expressly or by implication, by the party having the right to invoke it, as this Court has already recognized [see, Viviana Gallardo et al. (Judgment of November 13, 1981), No. G 101/81. Series A, para. 26]. Secondly, the objection asserting non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, to be timely, must be made at an early stage of the proceedings by the State entitled to make it, lest a waiver of the requirement be presumed. Thirdly, the State claiming non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective (Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88: Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No 2, para. 87; Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, para. 90; Gangaram Panday Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 4, 1991. Series C No. 12, para. 38 and Neira