4 12. In actual fact, international human rights protection (essential) and diplomatic protection (discretional), operating in fundamentally different ways and contexts, continue to co-exist nowadays, thereby mitigating the extreme vulnerability of many people. Diplomatic protection is conditioned by nationality (effective) as a vinculum juris, while international human rights protection emphasizes the general obligation of States Parties to human rights treaties, such as the American Convention, to respect and ensure the respect of the protected rights, for the benefit of all individuals subject to their respective jurisdictions, irrespective of their nationality. 13. ln this respect, this judgment of the Court provides a timely warning – bearing in mind the general obligations of the States Parties to the American Convention stipulated in Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof - that discriminatory administrative practices and legislative measures on nationality are prohibited (starting with its attribution and acquisition - paras. 141-142). The judgment takes care to emphasize the fact that Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosico were children, which increased their vulnerability, and jeopardized the development of their personalities, making it impossible to grant them the special protection of their rights to which they were entitled (para. 167); in this respect, the Court rightly recalled the important legacy of its own Advisory Opinion No. 17 (on the Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child, 2002) as regards their protection as subjects of inalienable and inherent rights (para. 177). 14. In this case of the Yean and Bosico children, the Court understood that the violation of the right to nationality and the rights of the child also resulted in the violation of the rights to juridical personality, to a name and to equal protection under the American Convention (paras. 174-175, 179-180 and 186-187). Significantly, following this same line of lucid reasoning – in keeping with the challenges of our times, which the Court commenced in its historical Advisory Opinion No. 19 on the Juridical Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants (2003) – it observed in this case that: "(...) the obligation to respect and ensure the principle of the right to equal protection and non-discrimination is irrespective of the migratory status of a person in a State. In other words, States have the obligation to ensure this fundamental principle to its citizens and to any foreigner who is on its territory, without any discrimination based on regular or irregular residence, nationality, race, gender or any other cause. In view of the above, (...) the Court considers that: a) The migratory status of a person cannot be a condition for the State to grant nationality, because migratory status can never constitute a justification for depriving a person of the right to nationality or the enjoyment and exercise of his rights; b) The migratory status of a persons is not transmitted to their children, and c) The fact that a person has been born on the territory of a State is the only fact that needs to be demonstrated for the acquisition of nationality, in the case of those persons who would not have the right to another nationality if they did not acquire that of the State where they were born” (paras. 155-156). III. The broad scope of the general protection obligations (Articles 1(1) and 2) of the American Convention. 15. Thus, the obligation to respect and ensure respect for the protected rights (Article 1(1) of the American Convention) is of a continuous and permanent nature; if the State does not take all possible measures to guarantee this, new victims may arise leading per se (owing to the State’s inaction) to additional violations, without these having to be related to the rights that were originally violated. Consequently, my understanding differs fundamentally from the argument according to which there