5 cannot be a violation of Article 1(1) of the Convention if it is not accompanied by a parallel and associated violation of the rights protected by the Convention. 16. This argument, which I cannot accept, corresponds to a restrictive, atomized and disaggregated vision of a general obligation to guarantee under the Convention as a whole. Allow me the metaphor that it would be equivalent to observing only the nearest tree and losing sight of the forest around it. My interpretation of Article 1(1) – and also of Article 2 - of the Convention is and always has been much broader, and evidently aggregative, maximizing the protection under the Convention. I stated this clearly, in this Court, more than eight years ago, in my dissenting opinion in the Case of Caballero Delgado and Santana versus Colombia (judgment on reparations of January 29, 1997). Allow me to recapitulate it here in brief, as a final reflection in this separate opinion. 17. States stated States When emphasizing the “comprehensive scope” of the general obligation of stipulated in Article 1(1) of the American Convention in that dissenting opinion, I that compliance with this obligation calls for a series of measures from the Parties to the Convention: "... to the effect of educating and empowering individuals under their jurisdiction to make full use of all the protected rights. They include the adoption of legislative and administrative measures designed to remove obstacles, fill in lacunae, and enhance the conditions for the exercise of the protected rights (para. 3). Thus, I added, to deny the “comprehensive scope” of Article 1(1) of the Convention would be to deprive the American Convention of its effects, since Article 1(1) "embraces all the rights” that the Convention protects (para. 4). 18. Subsequently, in the same dissenting opinion in the Case of Caballero Delgado and Santana, I sought to show that the two general obligations enshrined in the American Convention - Articles 1(1) and (2) – are “ineluctably intertwined” and I referred to hypothetical situations to illustrate this (para. 9). Further on, I expanded on this: "In my understanding, despite the assertion that there was no violation of Article 2 of the Convention, the finding of non-compliance with the general duty of Article 1(1) is per se sufficient to determine to the State Party that it ought to take measures, including of a legislative character, to guarantee to all persons under its jurisdiction the full exercise of all the rights protected by the American Convention" (para. 19). 19. Cases soon appeared in which the Inter-American Court itself took a stance in this respect. In the Case of Five Pensioners versus Peru (judgment of February 29, 2003), the Court concluded that the defendant State had committed an autonomous violation of the general obligation embodied in Article 2 of the Convention (of harmonizing its domestic law with the provisions of this article), in combination with the general obligation of Article 1(1) thereof (paras. 164-168). Previously, following the same line of thought, in Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. versus Peru (judgment of May 30, 1999), the Court determined that a violation of Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention had occurred separately (paras. 204-208). Also, in Case of Baena Ricardo et al. versus Panama (judgment of February 2, 2001), the Court decided that the defendant State had failed to comply with the general obligations of Articles 1(1) and (2) of the Convention, and devoted a whole chapter (No. XIII) of the judgment to this (paras. 176-184).