the admissibility of the petition, it is legitimate to question why it would be necessary to make an initial study of the petition and, furthermore, what would be the reason for and the practical effect of the Convention making a distinction between the moment of the lodging of the petition and the moment of its admissibility. Likewise, if it is considered that the said requirement or rule must be complied with when the decision on the admissibility of the petition is taken and not when it is lodged, it is logical to question the meaning of the petition itself. It should also be noted that, if the criterion that this compliance should have taken place at the time the petition is lodged or completed is not respected and, to the contrary, the thesis is adopted that compliance is determined when the Commission decides on the admissibility of the petition, this would result in situations of evident injustice or arbitrariness, insofar as the moment of this compliance would ultimately depend not on the victim or the petitioner, but on the Commission’s ruling when deciding on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the petition. Thus, the requirement would evidently not be the same in all cases, or known with due anticipation. II. THE FACTS RELATING TO THE OBJECTION OF PRIOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST DOMESTIC REMEDIES Based on the norms that have been mentioned, the relevant facts relating to the objection of non-compliance with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies are as follows. A. Those set out in the petition The petition of March 27, 2009, indicated that “[i]n this case, the petitioner ha[d] duly exhausted the ordinary remedies of the domestic jurisdiction because, as established in the third and fourth paragraphs of article 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in extradition proceedings, there is a single entity that decides a request of this nature[.] In other words, the jurisdictional extradition proceedings had concluded with the final judgment delivered by the Second Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice which declared that the extradition request was admissible.” As revealed by the above, the petitioner expressly indicated that, prior to the petition, he had exhausted the remedies established in the domestic jurisdiction, and did not make any mention of the situations indicated in Article 46(2) of the Convention in which it is unnecessary to apply the requirement under Article 46(1)(a) of this instrument. In other words, the situations in which it is not necessary to have previously exhausted the domestic remedies in order to lodge a petition before the Commission. B. Those contained in the State’s response or observations Meanwhile, in its observations on this petition presented on April 29, 2009, the State indicated that “Wong Ho Wing ha[d] not complied with exhausting the remedies of the domestic jurisdiction; thus, this party ask[ed] the Inter-American Commission to declare the inadmissibility of this petition pursuant to Article 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights, because the 56th Criminal Court of Lima decided to declare that the application for habeas corpus was well-founded in part and that the decision issued by the Second Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on January 20, 2009, was null, and that the Chamber should issue a new decision” and that “[t]his habeas corpus proceeding was still being processed.” 13