10 proper to the present domain of protection, based on premises fundamentally distinct from those which have guided the application of its postulates at the level of purely inter-State relations. 28. I am not, therefore, here proposing that the development of the Internacional Law of Human Rights be brought about to the detriment of the law of treaties: my understanding, entirely distinct, is in the sense that the norms of the law of treaties (such as those set forth in the two above-mentioned Vienna Conventions, anyway of a residual character) can greatly enrich with the impact of the International Law of Human Rights, and develop their aptitude to regulate adequately the legal relations at inter-State as well as intra-State levels, under the respective treaties of protection. In sustaining the development of a system of objective determination which seems to me wholly necessary - of the compatibility or otherwise of reservations with the object and purpose of human rights treaties in particular, in which the organs of international protection created by such treaties would exert an important role, I do not see in that any threat to the "unity" of the law of treaties. 29. Quite on the contrary, there could hardly be something more fragmenting and underdeveloped than the present system of reservations of the two Vienna Conventions, for which reason it would be entirely illusory to assume that, to continue applying it as until now, one would thereby be fostering the "unity" of the law of treaties. The true unity of the law of treaties, in the framework of Public International Law, would be better served by the search for improvement in this area, overcoming the ambiguities, uncertainties and lacunae of the present system of reservations, through the development of a system of objective determination (supra), in conformity with the special nature of human rights treaties and the objective character of the conventional obligations of protection. The unity of Public International Law itself is measured rather by its aptitude to regulate legal relations in distinct contexts with equal adequacy and effectiveness. 30. Despite of what happened in the present Blake case, in which the terms of acceptance by the respondent State of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court brought about the decomposition of the crime of forced disappearance of person (with direct consequences for the reparations to the injured party), there is no reason for desperation, for not existing juridical impossibility of achieving the humanization of the law of treaties. Thus, to quote one example in this sense, in providing for the conditions in which a breach of a treaty can result in its termination or the suspension of its application, the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties expressly and specifically exclude "the provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character" (Article 60(5)). 31. This provision resulted from a proposal submitted by Switzerland, in the second session of the Vienna Conference (1969) which adopted the first Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Its purpose was that of pointing out that the treaties of a humanitarian character have a special nature, do not exist for the sole benefit of the States, and transcend the reciprocity between the Parties in incorporating obligations of protection of an absolute character29. Such provision 29. I.M. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Manchester, University Press/Oceana, 1973, pp. 104-105; and cf. G.E. do Nascimento e Silva, Conferência de Viena sobre o Direito dos Tratados, Rio de Janeiro, M.R.E., 1971, pp. 80-81; E. de la Guardia y M. Delpech, El Derecho de los Tratados y la Convención de Viena, Buenos Aires, La Ley, 1970, pp. 458 and 454; F. Capotorti, "Il