13 treaties and conventions of human rights as well as of International Humanitarian Law33; moreover, the Statute of the International Penal Tribunal, adopted by the recent Diplomatic Conference of the United Nations in Rome, on 17 July 1998, in determining the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, includes the "crimes against humanity" (Article 5), which, in turn, comprise, inter alia, torture and the forced disappearance of persons (Article 7(1)(f) and (i)), when generalizedly and systematically perpetrated34. 39. The outcome of the Blake case, pointing in a direction opposite to a whole doctrinal evolution reflected in the international tipification of the forced disappearance of person and tending to the consolidation of a true international regime against grave violations of human rights, is thus endowed with an antihistorical sense, which is to me a matter of great concern. The present Blake case is in a way a stone on the path of the evolution of the more lucid doctrine and case-law to guide the struggle against grave violations of human rights. This stone on the path, however, will not make us lose sight of the line of the horizon, in which the development emerges of the peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens) and of the obligations erga omnes of protection of the human being. As I allowed myself to ponder in my Separate Opinion (paragraph 28) in the Judgment of the Court on the merits (of 24.01.1998) in the present Blake case, "The consolidation of erga omnes obligations of protection, as a manifestation of the emergence itself of imperative norms of international law, would represent the overcoming of the pattern erected upon the autonomy of the will of the State. The absolute character of the autonomy of the will can no longer be invoked in view of the existence of norms of jus cogens. It is not reasonable that the contemporary law of treaties continues to aligning itself to a pattern from which it sought gradually to free itself, in giving expression to the concept of jus cogens in the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties. It is not reasonable that, by the almost mechanical application of postulates of the law of treaties erected upon the autonomy of the will of the State, one would restrain - as in the present case - a reassuring evolution, fostered above all by the opinio juris as a manifestation of the universal juridical conscience, to the benefit of all human beings". 40. Our purpose ought to lie precisely upon the doctrinal and jurisprudencial development of the peremptory norms of International Law (jus cogens) and of the corresponding obligations erga omnes of protection of the human being. It is by means of the development in this sense35 that we will achieve to overcome the 33. As exemplified by the provisions on fundamental guarantees of the two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law of 1949 (Protocol I, Article 75, and Protocol II, Article 4). 34. These two "crimes against humanity" are defined in Article 7(2)(e) and (i) of the Statute referred to. 35. On the formation and development of the concept of jus cogens in contemporary International Law, cf., e.g.: J. Sztucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties - A Critical Appraisal, Wien/N.Y., Springer-Verlag, 1974, pp. 1-194; C.L. Rozakis, The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of Treaties, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publ. Co., 1976, pp. 1-194; A. Gómez Robledo, El Jus Cogens Internacional (Estudio Histórico Crítico), Mexico, UNAM, 1982, pp. 7-227; T.O. Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties, Leiden/Dobbs Ferry N.Y., Sijthoff/Oceana, 1974, ch. XII, pp. 177-187; G. Gaja, "Jus Cogens beyond the Vienna Convention", 172 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye (1981) pp. 279-313; L. Alexidze, "Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law", in ibid., pp. 227-268; R. Ago, "Droit des traités à la lumière de la Convention de Vienne - Introduction", 134