19 the action for amparo to contest the application of this decree directly or indirectly. In addition, a resolution of October 1992 had established that the Commission to Administer the Patrimony of Congress would not accept complaints concerning the results of the selection examination. Once the so-called Democratic Constituent Congress had been installed, it “declared that the 1979 Constitution was in force, except in the case of the decree laws issued by the Government. It also declared that the decree laws were in force until they were revised, modified or derogated” by this Congress. It did not question their validity. It was the constitutional procedure of amparo that “suffered the greatest modifications as of the coup [d’état] of April 5, 1992,” in addition to “the denaturalization of the procedural system of precautionary measures and […] the creation of arbitrary grounds for inadmissibility[. …I]n each of the decree laws where it was considered necessary, the Government began to include a provision that prevented the use of the amparo procedure to contest the [alleged] arbitrary acts that were committed.” In this regard, he listed 18 decree laws that contained such a provision - including Decree Law No. 25640. Subsequently, these grounds for inadmissibility “issued during the exercise of the de facto regime, denaturalized the amparo procedure, because they established areas outside jurisdictional control. Thus, specific international human rights norms were affected.” He also cited a judgment of the Constitutional Court of April 1997 establishing that “no authority could prevent individuals from exercising such actions when acts occur that threaten or violate constitutional rights that could be safeguarded by actions for protection (acciones de garantía).” The Constitutional Court did not rule on the validity of Decree Law No. 25640 in this case, even though it could have “made it inapplicable by means of diffuse control”; also, it used “an erroneous criterion to calculate time limits.” Moreover, in this regard, at the time of the facts “it was impossible to file an action for unconstitutionality, because the justices of the Constitutional Court […] had been removed from office […]. Also, an action for amparo would have been declared inadmissible, because the decree law that regulated this matter prevented it. […Further still,] the Judiciary was not totally and absolutely independent[, which] made it difficult for the judges to implement diffuse control.” “All of this affected the right to an effective recourse before the courts.” “At the administrative level, it was not possible to raise objections because [the said Resolution of October 1992 established that] the Administrative Commission […] would not accept complaints about the result of the examination.” In that regard, “this norm contradicted the provisions of the Regulations of the General Norms for Administrative Procedures […] in force [at the time of the facts,] which permitted the presentation of a recourse for reconsideration against any administrative act that affected the rights or interests of the individual concerned.” Expert witness proposed by the common intervenors h) Paúl Noriega Torero, economist He presented the technical calculations corresponding to the alleged loss of earnings and benefits of the dismissed employees. To this end, he based himself on the pay