45 125. In this regard, the Court has understood that, for an effective recourse to exist, it is not enough for it to be established by the Constitution or law, or be formally admissible; rather it needs to be truly appropriate for establishing whether there has been a human rights violation and for providing whatever is necessary to repair this.75 However, the fact that a specific recourse is decided against the party who filed it does not necessarily mean a violation of the right to judicial protection.76 126. The Court considers that, in any proceeding or process that exists under the State’s domestic system there should be extensive judicial guarantees, which should include the formalities that must be observed in order to guarantee access to these guarantees. To ensure legal certainty, for the proper and functional administration of justice and the effective protection of human rights, the States may and should establish admissibility principles and criteria for domestic recourses of a judicial or any other nature. Thus, although these domestic recourses must be available to the interested parties and result in an effective and justified decision on the matter raised, as well as potentially providing adequate reparation, it cannot be considered that always and in every case the domestic organs and courts must decide on the merits of the matter filed before them, without verifying the procedural criteria relating to the admissibility and legitimacy of the specific recourse filed. 127. In this regard, the State alleged that “if the alleged victims had filed the action for amparo within the time established by law, [the judge would have] applied the diffuse control of the constitutionality of the laws […] and would have ruled on the merits of the case, without applying [article 9 of Decree 25640].” The Court observes that this consisted in the power of the judge not to apply a particular norm in a specific case. There is no evidence in the file that, in cases heard by the Constitutional Court at the time of the facts, the latter would have applied that type of control. Furthermore, the expert witness Abad Yupanqui stated that “based on a norm [such as article 9 of Decree No. 25640], it was impossible to file an action for unconstitutionality at the time, because the justices of the Constitutional Court had been removed. […] At the time, the Judiciary lacked total and absolute independence from the Government. This made it difficult for judges to implement diffuse control by giving preference to the constitutional norm and not applying this decree based on unconstitutionality.” The State did not contest this opinion. 128. When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, the judges are also subject to it; this obliges them to ensure that the effet util of the Convention is not reduced or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions, object and purpose. In other words, the organs of the Judiciary should exercise not only a control of constitutionality, but also of “conventionality”77 ex officio between domestic norms and the American Convention; evidently in the context of their respective spheres of competence and the corresponding procedural regulations. This function should not be limited exclusively to the statements or actions of the plaintiffs in each specific case, although neither 75 Cf. Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa. Judgment of June 17, 2005. Series C No. 125, para. 61; Case of the “Five pensioners” . Judgment of February 28, 2003. Series C No. 98, para. 136, and Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Judgment of August 31, 2001. Series C No. 79, para. 113. 76 Cf. Case of Raxcacó Reyes . Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 133, para. 112, and Case of Fermín Ramírez. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 83. 77 Cf. likewise, Case of Almonacid Arellano et al., supra note 3, para. 124.