87 189. The American Convention requires States to make every effort to apply criminal sanctions with strict respect for people’s basic rights, after carefully ascertaining the actual existence of illegal conduct.168 190. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the criminal judge, upon applying criminal law, to strictly abide by the provisions thereof and be extremely rigorous when likening the accused person’s conduct to the criminal definition, so as not to punish someone for acts that are not punishable under the legal system.169 191. Pursuant to the principle of non-retroactivity of unfavorable criminal laws, the State must not exercise its punitive power by applying, retroactively, criminal laws that impose heavier penalties, establish aggravating circumstances or create aggravated definitions of the crime. Likewise, this principle implies that a person may not be convicted of an act that, at the time of its commission, was not criminalized or punishable.170 192. The Court shall now proceed to analyze the alleged violation of Article 9 of the Convention to the detriment of Wilson García-Asto and Urcesino Ramírez-Rojas, in connection with the compatibility of Peruvian legislation on terrorism and the rule of freedom from ex post facto laws as established in the American Convention, and shall subsequently analyze the proceedings conducted against the alleged victims. a) Criminal definitions related to terrorism in the Peruvian legislation 193. Legal provisions defining the crimes of collaboration with terrorism, membership in and affiliation with a terrorist organization and aggravated terrorism are applicable in the instant case. As regards the basic definition of terrorism, the Court has taken cognizance of the interpretation made by the Constitutional Court of Peru in its judgment of January 3, 2003 of the basic definition of the crime of terrorism as established in Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 25.475 which, pursuant to the Peruvian law, is binding upon all state authorities, (supra para. 97(6)). 194. In relation to the basic definition of the crime of terrorism as established in Article 2 of Decree-Law No. 25.475, it is to be noted that the Court has found no reasons to conclude that Article 9 of the Convention was violated, inasmuch as said criminal definition sets forth the elements of the criminalized conduct, differentiating it from acts which are either not punishable or punishable with non-criminal sanctions, and that it does not infringe other provisions set forth by the American Convention. The Court holds the same criterion as regards Articles 319 and 320 of the Criminal Code of 1991, which refer, respectively, to the crimes of terrorism and aggravated terrorism, as charged to Urcesino Ramírez-Rojas in the first proceedings. 168 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez, supra note 166, para. 90; Case of De la Cruz-Flores, supra note 4, para. 81; and Case of Baena Ricardo et al. Judgment of February 2, 2001. Series C No. 72, para. 106. 169 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez, supra note 166, para. 90; and Case of De la Cruz-Flores, supra note 4, para. 82. 170 Cf. Case of De la Cruz-Flores, supra note 4, para. 105; Case of Ricardo Canese. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 175; and Case of Baena Ricardo et al., supra note 168, para. 106.