8 24. The Martens clause thus continues to serve as a warning against the assumption that whatever is not expressly prohibited by the Conventions on International Humanitarian Law could be permitted; quite on the contrary, the Martens clause sustains the continuing applicability of the principles of the law of nations (droit des gens), the laws of humanity and the dictates (exigences) of public conscience, irrespective of the emergence of new situations and the development of technology 27. The Martens clause, thus, does not allow for non liquet, and it exerts an important role in the interpretation of humanitarian norms. 25. The fact that the draftsmen of the Conventions of 1899, 1907 and 1949, and of Protocol I of 1977, have reiteratedly asserted the elements of the Martens clause, places this latter at the level of the material sources themselves of International Humanitarian Law 28. Thus, it exerts a continuing influence in the spontaneous formation of the content of new rules of International Humanitarian Law 29. Contemporary juridical doctrine has also characterized the Martens clause as a source of general international law itself 30; and no one would dare today to deny that the "laws of humanity" and the "dictates of public conscience" invoked by the Martens clause belong to the domain of jus cogens 31. The clause referred to, as a whole, has been conceived and repeatedly affirmed, ultimately, to the benefit of all human kind, thus remaining quite up-to-date. It may be considered as an expression of the reason of humanity imposing limits to the reason of the State (raison d'État). 26. It is never to be forgotten that the State was originally conceived for the realization of the common good. The State exists for the human being, and not vice versa. No State can be considered to rest above the Law, whose norms have as ultimate addressees the human beings. The contemporary pari passu developments of the law of the international responsability of the State and of the international penal law point effectively towards the prominence of Law, both in the relations between the States and the human beings under their respective jurisdictions, as well as in the interindividual relations (Drittwirkung). It ought to be stated and restated firmly, whenever necessary: in the domain of the International Law of Human Rights, the socalled "laws" of self-amnesty are not truly laws: they are nothing but an aberration, an inadmissible affront to the juridical conscience of humanity. 27 . B. Zimmermann, "Protocol I - Article 1", Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (eds. Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann), Geneva, ICRC/Nijhoff, 1987, p. 39. 28 . H. Meyrowitz, "Réflexions sur le fondement du droit de la guerre", Études et essais sur le Droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la Croix-Rouge en l'honneur de Jean Pictet (ed. Christophe Swinarski), Genève/La Haye, CICR/Nijhoff, 1984, pp. 423-424; and cf. H. Strebel, "Martens' Clause", Encyclopedia of Public International Law (ed. R. Bernhardt), vol. 3, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982, pp. 252-253. 29 . F. Münch, "Le rôle du droit spontané", in Pensamiento Jurídico y Sociedad International - LibroHomenaje al Profesor Dr. Antonio Truyol Serra, vol. II, Madrid, Universidad Complutense, 1986, p. 836; H. Meyrowitz, op. cit. supra n. (128), p. 420. It has already been pointed out that, in ultima ratio legis, International Humanitarian Law protects humanity itself, facing the dangers of armed conflicts; Christophe Swinarski, Principales Nociones e Institutos del Derecho Internacional Humanitario como Sistema Internacional de Protección de la Persona Humana, San José of Costa Rica, IIDH, 1990, p. 20. 30 . F. Münch, op. cit. supra n. (28), p. 836. 31 . S. Miyazaki, "The Martens Clause and International Humanitarian Law", Études et essais... en l'honneur de J. Pictet, op. cit. supra n. (27), pp. 438 and 440.