SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ CONCERNING THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GOIBURÚ ET AL. V. PARAGUAY OF SEPTEMBER 22, 2006 1. I concur with my colleagues’ opinion as expressed in the judgment in this case, without detriment to establishing – or reiterating – some concerns relating to certain concepts, whose meaning and scope requires commentary. Evidently, this clarification – in which I respect the opinion of those who have a different point of view – does not alter my concurring participation in the unanimous decision that sustains the Court’s ruling on merits and reparations. 2. The concept of the State’s “aggravated responsibility” has been used in the judgment I am examining, and this needs to be re-examined. For several years, I have been referring to this element, as can be seen in my separate opinion in relation to the judgment delivered by the Inter-American Court in the Case of Myrna Mack Chang of November 25, 2003. Evidently, I do not ignore or question the useful burden of reproach that this expression may have when it is used to publicly assess certain facts and encourage their rejection. 3. The expression “aggravated responsibility” suggests that there is a series of responsibilities of different importance or intensity: ranging from slight to grave, and possibly passing through intermediate categories. To the contrary, the reference to “aggravated” responsibilities would have no meaning. Moreover, this turn of phrase should have an equivalence in the descending order of alleged responsibilities: “attenuated responsibility,” which has never appeared in the Court’s case law. 4. In my opinion, this “aggravated” responsibility does not exist, and neither does “attenuated” responsibility, because simple responsibility (without considerations of intensity or nuance) implies the possibility or need “to respond” for certain acts owing to legal evidence of attribution that links specific conduct to a particular person who must respond for it juridically by the establishment of certain consequences. 5. Obviously, this does not mean that human rights violations lack their “own characteristics” and are always equally grave. It is the responsibility that is uniform – a logical juridical connection between an act, the person responsible and certain consequences – not the facts from which this derives, or the effects that a court attributes to them. In other words, the facts may be described as slight, grave or extremely grave, and the consequences, as ordinary, severe or very severe. To the contrary, responsibility is merely responsibility. 6. I will give some example to clarify what I am endeavoring to say. The violation of the right to humane treatment is extremely grave – owing to the importance of the juridical rights affected and the type of the acts that comprise this violation – when a victim is subjected to torture. The violation of the right to life becomes notoriously and intensely grave when it is the deprivation of the life of a series of individuals who are executed brutally. The violation of the right to liberty, among others, is very grave when it is practiced arbitrarily, prolonged for some time, and becomes forced disappearance in the terms of international law. It can also be maintained that the facts are more serious when the authors are senior State officials, from whom there are higher expectations of guarantee – hence, they are