3 case of “33 Chilean citizens disappeared following their capture by Argentine, Paraguayan or Brazilian agents, and handed over to DINA, in just 1975 and 1976.”5 The Rettig Report refers expressly to “Operation Condor”: “The origins of DINA’s foreign structure seem to date back to April or May of 1974. […] From mid-1974 onward, DINA increasingly developed a “foreign capability” which included having operational forces in various countries. […] In order to engage in the same kind of political repression in other countries, DINA took the first steps toward coordinating intelligence services in the Southern Cone, including, besides Chile, the security services or similar groups in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil. The group that emerged, which was apparently coordinated by DINA, came to be called “Condor,” although some think that name referred not to the group or community itself but rather to a series of coordinated operations they undertook. DINA also maintained bilateral relations with various foreign intelligence services, including the CIA.”6 Likewise, the corrected and updated summary of the Rettig Report (2nd ed., 1999) refers expressly to the “operational plan called ‘Condor,’ which included the elimination of political opponents.”7 11. In its Report “Nunca Más” [Never Again] (the first edition of which is dated November 1984), the Argentine National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons states, in relation to the “repressive coordination” in Latin America: “The illegal repressive operations undertaken by the Government and the activities of persecution linked to them were not confined by geographical boundaries. The security organizations of neighboring states collaborated with these activities in reciprocal arrangements whereby people were arrested with no regard for legality, in blatant violation of the international treaties and conventions on political asylum and refuge to which our country subscribes. The agents of foreign repressive regimes operated in our country and arrested Uruguayans, Paraguayans, Bolivians and other nationals. Foreigners were clandestinely abducted with impunity and handed over to the authorities of their respective countries. […] The method used consisted basically of a linking-up of illegal, repressive groups, which acted together as a single force. […] The events which occurred demonstrated the existence of a typically 'multinational' repressive apparatus. Under its protection, the foreign forces of repression were integrated into the task groups and became involved in kidnapping, interrogation under torture, assassination.”8 12. How should we assess this immense distortion of the purposes of the State, when considering the acts carried out under “Operation Condor,” which are still not completely known in all their macabre details? In the conceptual universe of law, this distortion was consummated and accentuated, in my opinion, to the extent that those responsible for exercising power (and their doctrinaires) and for legislative activities, deviated from the iusnaturalist principles of the legal system. In this regard, M. García-Pelayo pondered correctly that: “The rule of law signifies […] that the State’s power is limited by law, but not the possibility of legitimizing any criteria by giving it the form of law […]. Even though 5 . Ibid., p. 5. 6 . Cit. in Informe Rettig, tome II, Santiago, Chile, Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, February 1991, pp. 455-457 (emphasis added). 7 . Cit. in: Nunca Más en Chile - Síntesis Corregida y Actualizada del Informe Rettig, 2nd. ed., Santiago, Chile, Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos/Fundación Ideas, 1999, p. 63. 8 . Cit. in: Nunca Más – Informe de la Comision Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, 20a. ed., Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 1995, pp. 265-266.