29 mass media) with the clear concept that 80% of our success will be based on true and opportune intelligence and only 20% on action (execution).19 After making an extended analysis of the guerrilla situation on the continent, the document praises the values of Paraguayan traditionalism and nationalism, with a profusion of expressions relating to the “national essence and being,” “supreme values of Paraguayanism,” “soul of the autochthonous race” and “concept of mother country and native soil.” Lastly, the following ‘recommendations” were made: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Direct exchange of information Technical and personal links. Program joint meetings to discuss security issues in the areas of YACYRETAAPIPE and CORPUS, particularly with the participation of the company’s security elements. Exchange of doctrine, organization and instruction. Possibility of expanding the bilateral nature of the Intelligence Conferences […].20 The Paraguayan delegation’s recommendations did not remain a simple wish list. In the following months – especially during the next two years – the multinational agents of Cóndor carried out surveillance, abductions and executions throughout the southern part of the continent without the borders being an obstacle. In October 1975, the “FIRST NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WORKING MEETING” was held in Santiago, Chile, with the participation of representatives of several South American armies. A working document produced by the Chilean National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), headed by Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, was kept in the files. In this document – labeled “SECRET” – the hosts propose to implement the exchange of information by creating a Coordination and Security Agency founded on three basic elements: […] A. Databank To establish, in one of the countries represented here, a central file of background information on persons, organizations and activities, directly or indirectly related to subversion. In general, something similar to the INTERPOL databank in Paris, but devoted to subversion. […] B. Information Center […] for example, the system could be composed of: 1. 2. 3. 4. Telex transmissions Cryptography mechanisms Telephones with voice inverters Correspondence This system must be managed, financed and fed by the security services of interested countries, based on a series of regulations. 19 Cf. filing cabinet 245 of the “Terror Archives”, p. 1612, transcribed in Es mi informe, supra note 11, p. 255. 20 Cf. filing cabinet 1008 of the “Terror Archives”, p. 1377, transcribed in Es mi informe, supra note 11, p. 256.