8 which appears to me best to reflect the letter and spirit of the American Convention12. 30. To the extent that the notion of obligations erga omnes gradually consolidates itself in respect of human rights, it will become increasingly clearer that there is no need to wait for the occurrence of a damage (material or moral), subsequent to the original violation of a protected right, by means of the application of a law. This is so because the original violation, that is, the non-compliance with a conventional obligation pertaining to any of the protected rights, entails per se and ipso facto the configuration or the birth of the international responsibility of the State. 31. In this way, in the cas d'espèce, even if Article 54(2) and (3) of the Code of Military Justice of Venezuela had not been applied in the El Amparo case, the sole fact that it is in force and its applicability affect the protected rights, by virtue of the extent of the discretionary power attributed to the President of the Republic of, as an "official of military justice", interfering in the exercise of the full judicial guarantees. The Government of Venezuela, besides having taken the positive initiative of the recognition of responsibility in the El Amparo case, gave another sign of good will at a given moment of the proceedings, in expressly pointing out, in the reply to the Commission's petition (of 01 August 1994), its "readiness to continue and conclude the process of revision of the Code of Military Justice and of Article 54(2) and (3) in particular" (page 13)13. 32. In the light of all the above, I understand that the Court should have included the revision of those provisions of the aforementioned Venezuelan military legislation among the measures of reparation owed to the victims of the violations of human rights in El Amparo. I consider the measures of non-pecuniary reparation to be much more important than the Court seems to assume. 33. I dare to nourish the hope that these brief thoughts may contribute to advances in the present domain of protection, so as to leave a better world to our descendants. I do hope, in particular, that these remarks may someday lead the Court to reassess willingly its current position on the question at issue, and thus to free itself from the strings with which it has been tightening itself, with a self-imposed limitation which 12. The European Court of Human Rights has, in this regard, without actually admitting the actio popularis, gone much further than the Inter-American Court (cf. jurisprudential references in my Dissenting Opinions in the aforementioned El Amparo and Caballero Delgado and Santana cases, Reparations). However, what should occur is exactly the opposite, since the American Convention (Article 44), distinctly from the European Convention (Article 25), not even requires, of the complainants, the condition of "victims", but only of "petitioners" (peticionarios) lato sensu. It is, thus, in this regard, a much more liberal system than the European (even though without going as far as providing for actio popularis either), and, even so, the Inter-American Court does not seem to have extracted the consequences of what the American Convention itself provides, in so far as the condition of the complainants (peticionarios) is concerned. 13. And it added that, in the meantime, "it undertakes not to apply the aforementioned provision of Article 54(2) and (3) of the Code of Military Justice, in matters that may allow grave violations of human rights to remain unpunished" (page 14). However, subsequently, in its brief on reparations (of 27 December 1995), it expressed its understanding that "the Code of Military Justice is not, by itself, incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. At most, it would have been so the application given to it in the El Amparo case, as it has been recognized by the Republic of Venezuela. The impugned articles of the Code represent only a faculty of the President of the Republic, not an imposition and, accordingly, their mere existence and their adequate application cannot mean a violation of the international order" (page 6).