69 “illegal deprivation of freedom in its modality of plagiarism or kidnapping,” and not for ‘forced disappearance of persons’ […].” According to the representatives, the Special Prosecutors’ Office stated that “[w]hen the illegal acts were committed the crime [of forced disappearance] had not been defined.” In that sense, they stated, among other things, that “[t]he State of Mexico defined [that crime] on April 25, 2001 in the Federal Criminal Code,” reason for which being that the forced disappearance was a “continued” crime when the case was presented, “[t]he crime was still being committed and[,] therefore[,] the State could apply that legal classification already contemplated in the national legislation.” The representatives argued that “[t]he deficient presentation […] implied ignoring the seriousness of the crimes […],” and the context in which they were committed. 236. The State indicated that “[t]he cabinet authority brought forth […] on August 11, 2005, the General Francisco Quirós [sic] Hermosillo, who it considered the probable responsible party for the commission of the crime of illegal deprivation of freedom in its modality of plagiarism or kidnapping, established and punished by [the] Criminal Code […] in force at the time the criminal acts occurred.” The Tribunal observes that during the processing of the case before the Inter-American Commission, the State offered greater detail in this sense and indicated that “[l]ikewise, the [CIDFP] would be inapplicable, given the Interpretative Declaration the [State] introduced upon its ratification, which prevents its retroactive application.”238 Before the Inter-American Commission, the State added that “[i]n the assumption […] that the application of the crime of forced disappearance were feasible […], there is an unsurpassable obstacle, which consists in the fact that the elements of the crime require that the author of the crime be a public official, […] being that in the present case, the defendant Francisco Quiroz Hermosillo retired, that is, left the active service of the National Mexican Army, as of June 15, 2000 […]; reason for which at the moment the legal classification went into force in the federal Mexican punitive law […] he was no longer a public official […].”239 237. During the processing before the Commission, the State also mentioned that “[t]he forced disappearance of persons is committed by public officials and the modality of plagiarism or kidnapping of the crime of illegal deprivation of freedom can also be committed by public officials and not only by individuals.” Additionally, the State argued that both are considered grave crimes pursuant with federal legislation on criminal procedures, reason for which both establish a maximum punishment of 40 years in prison; both have the nature of being permanent or continued crimes, defined by the Federal Criminal Code; and that the “[s]tart of the calculation of the term for the statute of limitation in both crimes, starts once it has ceased[, that is,] once the whereabouts of the victim are known or the victim is freed.”240 238. In this regard, the Court has established that the forced disappearance of persons is a differentiated phenomena, characterized by the multiple and continuous violation of several rights protected in the Convention.241 In that sense, and in attention to the 238 Cf. State’s communication of June 5, 2006 (dossier of appendixes to the application, appendix 1(25), folio 475). 239 Cf. State’s communication of June 5, 2006 (dossier of appendixes to the application, appendix 1(25), folio 477). 240 Cf. State’s communication of June 5, 2006 (dossier of appendixes to the application, appendix 1(25), folio 477). 241 Cf. Case of Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 51, para. 92; Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, supra note 24, para. 181, and Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra note 44, para. 59.