10 the instant Case, nor was their authenticity questioned, for which reason the Court deems them to be valid. 30. No objections were made either to the statement of witness Ms. Carmen Aguirre or the expert report by Dr. Ernesto Albán-Gómez. The Court therefore deems the facts stated by the former and the expert's observations on Ecuadorian law to have been proven. 31. The State, invoking Article 38(1) of the Rules of Procedure then in force, objected to the Court's hearing the testimony of Mr. Rafael Iván Suárez-Rosero, Ms. Margarita Ramadán de Suárez and Carlos Ramadán in its brief of September 9, 1996. Ecuador advanced the following reasons for its objections: first because he had been accused in criminal case No. 181-95 brought against Mr. Hugo ReyesTorres for drug trafficking, and was a defendant in that case as an accessory to the crime. Second and third, on the ground that they were not qualified as they could not be independent, they being his wife and brother-in-law, who had a direct relationship with the principal perpetrator in the instant Case. On September 11, 1996, the Court decided to "[h]ear the statements of Mr. Rafael Iván Suárez-Rosero, Margarita Ramadán de Suárez, and Carlos Ramadán, the value of which shall be assessed in the final judgment." 32. It is the well-settled jurisprudence of this Court that any interest which a witness may have in the outcome of a case, is not enough, per se, to disqualify such witness. This principle is eminently applicable to the evidence given by Margarita Ramadán de Suárez and Carlos Ramadán. Moreover, their statements were not contested by the State and referred to facts of which the witnesses had direct knowledge. Consequently, those statements must be admitted as suitable evidence in this Case. 33. With regard to the statement of Mr. Rafael Iván Suárez-Rosero, the Court considers that, since he is the alleged victim in this case and has a possible direct interest in it, his testimony should be assessed in the context of all the evidence in the Case. However, the Court deems it necessary to make one stipulation on the value of this testimony. The Commission argues that Mr. Suárez-Rosero was held incommunicado by the State from June 23 to July 28, 1992. If this were proven, it would necessarily imply that only Mr. Suárez-Rosero and the State would be aware of the treatment the former received during that period. Consequently, they would be the only ones entitled to present evidence on those conditions in the proceeding. In that regard, the Court has already established that in the exercise of its judicial functions and when ascertaining and weighing the evidence necessary to decide the cases before it, the Court may, in certain circumstances, make use of both circumstantial evidence and indications or presumptions on which to base its pronouncements when they lead to consistent conclusions as regards the facts of the case (Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 49). In accordance with this principle, since it has been proven (infra, para. 34(d)) that Mr. Suárez-Rosero was held incommunicado during the period indicated by the Commission, his testimony on the conditions of his incommunicado detention acquires a highly presumptive value, especially when one considers that the State declared that it "could not confirm or guarantee anything" relating to the treatment meted out to Mr. Suárez-Rosero during the time he was held incommunicado. VII