16 pursuant thereto. 3. 43. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. The Court has said that no one may be deprived of personal liberty except for reasons, or in cases or circumstances expressly described in the law (material aspect), but, moreover, with strict adherence to the procedures objectively defined by it (formal aspect) (Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 47). With regard to the formal requirements, the Court observes that the Political Constitution of Ecuador provides in Article 22(19)(h) that: [n]o one shall be deprived of his liberty except by written order of the competent authority, as appropriate, for the period and according to the procedures prescribed by law, save in the case of flagrante delicto, in which case he may not either be held without a trial order for more than twenty-four hours. In either case, he may not be held incommunicado for more than twenty-four hours and that, pursuant to Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ecuador, [t]he court may issue a writ of preventive imprisonment when it deems it to be necessary, provided the following procedural data are presented: 1. Evidence leading to a presumption of the existence of a crime that warrants the punishment of deprivation of liberty; and, 2. Evidence leading to a presumption that the accused is the author of or accomplice in the crime in question. The evidence on which the order of imprisonment are based shall be stated in the records. 44. It was not demonstrated in the instant Case that Mr. Suárez-Rosero was apprehended in flagrante delicto. His arrest should therefore have been effected with a warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. However, the first judicial proceeding relating to his detention only took place on August 12, 1992 (supra, para. 34(i)), that is, over a month after his arrest, in violation of procedures previously established by the Political Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure of Ecuador. 45. The Court deems it unnecessary to voice an opinion on the evidence or suspicions that may have led to a detention order. The relevant point is that such an order was only produced in this case long after the victim's arrest. This was expressly acknowledged by the State during the public hearing, when it said that "Mr. Suárez was the victim of arbitrary detention." 46. As to the place in which Mr. Suárez-Rosero was held incommunicado, the Court deems it to have been proven that he spent from June 23 to July 23, 1992, at a police station unsuitable as accommodation for a prisoner, according to the Commission and the expert (supra, para. 34(d)), in addition to all the violations of the right to liberty to the detriment of Mr. Suárez-Rosero. 47. For the above reasons, the Court finds that the Mr. Suárez-Rosero' arrest and his subsequent detention from June 23, 1992, were carried out in violation of the provisions contained in Article 7(2) and (3) of the American Convention.