26 that some prisoners sought refuge in the cells to protect their lives while others were trying to escape. 60(17) Another version is based on a report issued by the Prison Service Office of Detention Center of Catia, which states that at 6:10 am of November 27, 1992 “the Prison Guard Office was informed that the prisoners of South Wing Halls 4 and 5 were breaking the locks, inciting a riot to cause a mass breakout and that guard officers immediately shot at them.” 60(18) Regardless of the two versions of the events giving rise to the violent incident, during the 48 hours of the events that unfolded within Detention Center of Catia, approximately 63 prisoners died, including the 37 victims in the instant case (infra para. 60(26)), 52 were injured and 28 disappeared. The investigations conducted by the authorities have failed to determine the total number of victims and the reports available are incomplete, confusing and contradictory. 60(19) It is undeniable that the situation was handled with the active intervention of the National Guard and the Metropolitan Police, who shot indiscriminately at the prisoners using firearms and tear gas. Several prisoners and prison officers’ statements corroborate these facts. According to a report from the Deputy Superintendent, Chief of Public Order Division of the Metropolitan Police, which contains “the Description of Long-range Weapons delivered at the Weapons Depot of the 27th Special Brigade on November 27, 1992 and a list of the personnel (including ranks and badge numbers) who worked that day at Detention Center of Catia and the surrounding area,” 485 officers of the Metropolitan Police participated in the operation, carrying 126 firearms that were identified by serial number and type of weapon. Ballistics tests conducted by the Technical Corps of the Judicial Police on the bullets found in the prisoners’ bodies as well as on the entry and exit wounds in the bodies, confirmed that the deaths were caused by bullet wounds from weapons that were similar or identical to those used by the law enforcement forces. 60(20) In several autopsy reports on the bodies found at Detention Center of Catia, wound paths showed that some of the prisoners were shot in the back or side. 60(21) The State failed to adopt the necessary measures to ensure, in a timely and efficient manner, the necessary procedures and medicine to provide medical treatment to those injured as a result of the incidents. 60(22) The actions taken by the National Guard as well as by the Metropolitan Police and the prison Guard during the first 24 hours of the incidents were never verified by any civil authority. Authorities from the Public Prosecutor’s Office were denied access to the Detention Center by the National Guard due to alleged safety concerns. 60(23) Between November 28 and 29, 1992, scores of prisoners were transferred from Detention Center of Catia to the following prisons: Penitenciaría General de Venezuela (Guárico), Internado Judicial Capital El Rodeo (Guatire) and Centro Penitenciario de Carabobo (Valencia). Transfers were made without notice to prisoners’ families. 60(24) The next of kin of the prisoners who were transferred had no knowledge of their whereabouts or fate. Before this, the authorities kept the prisoners at the yards for many hours, forcing them to be naked and in uncomfortable positions.