90. The Court notes that the exclusion from the benefit of the maximum limit of preventive detention established in the said Law No. 24,390 gave rise to unequal treatment compared to individuals in preventive detention accused of an offense other than drug-trafficking who, when they had served the two years stipulated in that law had the right to request their release. Those individuals also benefited from the maximum duration of preventive detention, which could not exceed three years, as stipulated in the aforementioned article 1, and required their automatic release when they had served the three years of preventive detention. 91. In this regard, the Court has established that States must refrain from taking measures that are in any way addressed, either directly or indirectly, at creating situations of discrimination de jure or de facto.92 Also, if the discriminatory treatment relates to an unequal protection of domestic law or its application, the fact must be analyzed in light of Article 24 of the American Convention93 in relation to the categories protected by Article 1(1) of the Convention. The Court recalls that a difference in treatment is discriminatory when it does not have an objective and reasonable justification;94 in other words, when it does not seek a legitimate purpose and there is no reasonable proportionality between the measures used and the purpose sought.95 92. In the instant case, the Court notes that the exclusion of all those accused of drug-trafficking from the benefit of the maximum duration of preventive detention was justified by the interest in prosecuting that type of criminal organization – and its members – dedicated to the traffic of narcotic substances, as well as by the obligations assumed by the State on signing the United Nations Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Nevertheless, the Court notes that Mr. Jenkins was automatically excluded from the benefit of release merely on the basis of the specific offense of which he was accused, without being provided with an explanation of the specific purpose sought by the difference in treatment, its appropriateness, necessity, and proportionality and, also, without taking into account his personal circumstances. 96 93. Here it is pertinent to note the case law of the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina. In a judgment of June 15, 2010, in case No. 5640, it declared that the said article 10 of Law No. 24,390 was unconstitutional because: […] [The assumption by our country of international commitments with regard to the fight against the illicit traffic in drugs and psychotropic substances cannot be used as sufficient grounds for rendering inoperative constitutional rights such as the presumption of innocence, personal liberty, and the reasonable time for the duration of the proceedings. […] The decision of the ordinary legislator to deprive a certain category of individuals from the benefits established in Law 24,390 entails not only the violation of their right to the presumption of innocence, but also the violation of the guarantee that the American Convention on Human Rights also grants them in its Art. 7(5). […] An exception that strips part of the prison population of a fundamental right based merely on the nature of the offense that they are accused of Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 18, para. 103, and Case of Ramírez Escobar et al. v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 9, 2018. Series C No. 351, para. 270. 92 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 209, and Case of Ramírez Escobar et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 272. 93 Cf. Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02 of August 28, 2002. Series A No. 17, para. 46, and Case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2016. Series C No. 315, para. 125. 94 Cf. Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, Members and Activist of the Mapuche Indigenous People) v. Chile, supra, para. 200, and Case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador, supra, para. 125. 95 96 Cf. Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 227, and Case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador, supra, para. 126. 24