A. Arguments of the parties and the Commission 102. The Commission argued that the entire proceedings for damages lasted nine years and three months, which exceeded a reasonable time. It indicated that the process was not complex because the purpose of the action for damages filed by Mr. Jenkins was to obtain pecuniary compensation for the preventive detention and that the court’s determination of the State’s possible responsibility for the facts did not require it to gather extensive evidence or elucidate significant factual disputes. In addition, regarding the action of the state authorities, the Commission argued that it had no information that any action had been taken between June 2000 and 2007 and that it was the State’s obligation to describe and prove the reasons why it had required more time than was reasonable to deliver the final judgment. Furthermore, according to the Commission, no information had been provided that Mr. Jenkins had obstructed the proceedings. Consequently, the Commission concluded that the State had failed to comply with the guarantee of a reasonable time in violation of Articles 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument. 103. The representatives submitted similar arguments to the Commission; adding that the State had violated the right to judicial protection and a reasonable time in the context of the action for damages. 104. Meanwhile, the State argued that, in the context of the action for damages filed against the State, the procedural activity of Mr. Jenkins had a determinant impact on the duration of the judicial proceedings. In particular, it referred to the filing of remedies that, according to the State, from the outset were evidently destined to be rejected. 105. The State also indicated that the Commission had analyzed the duration of the total processing of the case without taking into account the other standards established by the Court’s case law: in other words, “the complexity of the matter, the procedural activity of the interested party, the conduct of the judicial authorities, and the effects on the situation of the individual involved in the proceedings.” It argued that, according to its domestic law, a contrario sensu to criminal cases that must be instituted ex officio, civil cases depend solely and exclusively on the momentum provided to the proceedings by the plaintiff and, therefore, if the proceedings had an excessive duration it was due to the negligent procedural conduct of Mr. Jenkins. B. Considerations of the Court 106. In its consistent case law, the Court has considered that a prolonged delay in the proceedings may, of itself, constitute a violation of judicial guarantees. 104 The Court has established that the assessment of the reasonable time should be made in each specific case based on the total duration of the proceedings, which could also include execution of the final judgment. Accordingly, it has considered that four factors must be examined to decide whether the guarantee of a reasonable time has been complied with, namely: (i) the complexity of the matter, (ii) the procedural activity of the interested party; (iii) the conduct of the judicial authorities, and (iv) the effects on the legal situation of the presumed victim. The Court recalls that it corresponds to the State to justify, based on these factors, the reason why it has required the time that has elapsed to process a case and, if it does not do so, the Court has broad powers to come to its own conclusions in this regard. 105 The Court also reiterates that the total duration of the proceedings must be assessed, from the first procedural action until a final judgment is delivered, including any appeals that might eventually be filed.106 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 145, and Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 154. 104 105 Cf. Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, supra, para. 156, and Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru, supra, para. 155. Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Reparations and costs. Judgment of January 20, 1999. Series C No. 44, para. 71, and Case of Quispialaya Vilcapoma v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 106 27