disproportionate if it was considered that his responsibility had not been established and that his innocence was subsequently declared; (v) the rejection of his request for release when he had served two years of preventive detention, and (vi) his absence had caused harm to his family circle owing to the loss of social and employment opportunities. 114 113. The Court notes that the action filed by Mr. Jenkins entailed an analysis by the judicial authorities of whether there had been a judicial error in the case. Therefore, this determination did not require a multitude of evidence that was difficult to assess; rather, they had to examine the judicial rulings relating to the decision to incarcerate Mr. Jenkins, as well as the subsequent judicial decisions that rejected his request to be released. Consequently, this Court notes that the action for damages filed by Mr. Jenkins did not involve particularly complex elements. b.2 Procedural activity of the interested party 114. With regard to the procedural activity of the interested party, the State argued that, in the context of the proceedings, Mr. Jenkins had taken certain steps that delayed them. For example, the State indicated that the delay in the proceedings was due to the following: 1) The action filed against the intervening judge and prosecutors was not in keeping with the special procedure established for that purpose, and this delayed the processing of the case from the outset because the prosecutors who had been sued asked that they be removed from the proceedings since they lacked the authority to represent the Public Prosecution Service in trials against it based on liability, and this was accepted by the judge in charge of the proceedings. Consequently, thereafter the Ministry of Justice assumed the representation of the National State. Also, the judge filed the objection of lack of legitimacy to be sued, and the court admitted this. 2) Mr. Jenkins failed to indicate in the action for damages the arguments concerning the arbitrary nature of his detention and the rejections of his release based on the application of a law that, in his understanding, was unconstitutional. This prevented the domestic courts from examining this matter. 3) The filing of an appeal against the judicial decision to open the case to evidence. 4) The offer of information via letters rogatory sent to the island of Gran Canaria represented at least 18 months of procedures, which delayed the evidence stage. 5) The offer of testimonial evidence that Mr. Jenkins later withdrew during the proceedings. 6) The late presentation of his arguments, which meant that the judgment was delivered without being able to consider – owing to Mr. Jenkins’ negligence, according to the State – his arguments on the evidence produced in the case. 7) The omission of a specific reasoned criticism of the parts that Mr. Jenkins considered erroneous in the ruling on the appeal against the first instance judgment that led the justices of Chamber III of the National Appellate Chamber for Federal Administrative Disputes to declare the remedy void. Cf. Action for damages filed by Mr. Jenkins against the State and against the judge who ordered his detention, of December 27, 1999 (evidence file, folios 4820 to 4836). 114 29