57 has acknowledged the State’s international responsibility in this international procedure (above paras. 40-4), and before that, with the creation of the CVR and the “Ad Hoc State Prosecutor’s Office for the Cases of Montesinos and Fujimori, and those that should be held 85 responsible,” the Judiciary and the Legislature. 86. In this regard, the creation of the CVR is of utmost importance. As it is pointed out in the final report of the CVR, after the “fall of the Fujimori Administration […] one of the first actions taken by the transitory government, in December 2001, was the creation of the Inter-Institutional Workgroup leading to the establishment of the Truth Commission with the participation of the Ministries of Justice, the Interior, Defense, Promotion of Women and Human Development, the People’s Ombudsman, the Peruvian Episcopal Conference the Peruvian Evangelist Association, and the National Human Rights Coordinating Committee […] The Inter-institutional Workgroup suggested that the CVR should review crimes attributable to all the parties to the conflict, that is, «both the events attributable to State agents, events attributable to individuals who acted with State agents’ consent, acquiescence or connivance, as well as those events that are attributable to subversive groups». […] No modification was made to the timeframe of the CVR’s competence suggested by [that] group […], and it was so expressed in the final version of its mandate. In fact, the Supreme Decree approved by the Council of Ministries [in 2001] included the suggestion that the events that occurred between 1980 and 2000 should fall within the scope of the investigations […] No relevant change was made to the subject matter of the CVR’s competence throughout both of the preparation stages either. In fact, all the crimes 86 indicated by the Work Group […] were contemplated in the Supreme Decree.” 87. In connection with the abovementioned context, according to the CVR, as of the coup d’etat of April 5, 1992: There was established a de facto regime that suspended the democratic institutional structure of the country by the overt intervention in the Judiciary, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Public Ministry and other constitutional bodies. Actions of governance were implemented by means of executive orders passed by the so-called «Government of National Reconstruction and Emergency» entrusted with both executive and legislative functions of the State for a short time, thus neutralizing in practice the political and judicial control over its actions. In the light of the most recent judicial investigation, it can be concluded further that during this time State resources were used to organize, train and engage operative groups under cover, whose main objective was the murder, disappearance and torture of persons, all of which was carried out under the halo of the National Intelligence Service. This is explained in the case of the self-called «Grupo Colina»87 88. In fact, it was in the final report of the CVR on which the Inter-American Commission extensively based the allegations of its application —allegations which were in turn 85 Cf. Supreme resolution No. 241-2000-JUS, granting “additional powers of the Ad hoc Attorney Generals to file relevant legal actions against certain former public official on the grounds of alleged crimes of corruption and other offenses,” and the resolution of Presidency of the Judicial Defense Council No. 016-2001-JUS/CDJE-P, dated July 31, 2001 (record of Appendixes to answer to application, pp. 3221, 3222, 3229 and 3930). 86 The Truth Commission would focus its work on the following facts, provided always that they are attributable to terrorist organizations, to State agents or to paramilitary groups: a) Murder and abduction; b) forced disappearance; c) torture and other severe injuries; d) violation of collective rights of Andean Communities and Communities native to the country; e) Other crimes against and severe violations of the rights of persons. Cf. Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003, Section I, Chapter 4, “The Legal Dimension of the Events,” p. 195. 87 Cf. Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2003, Section I, Chapter 4, “The Legal Dimension of the Events,” p. 242.