72 filing several complaints, none of which was given the prompt treatment they deserved in light of the seriousness of the facts denounced; d) the egregious clue to the disappearance and execution of the victims required that the prosecutors, police officials and other relevant authorities go to every effort to carry out an effective search and an efficient investigation in proportion to the seriousness and significance of the facts denounced, which did not happen; e) regardless of the lack of competence per se of the military courts to try human rights violations, the grave irregularities committed deliberately and systematically in the instant case by the different State powers to support the intervention of military courts and eventually determine their competence, reveal a policy seeking to obstruct investigations in ordinary courts with the clear purpose of covering up for those responsible. This official policy of concealment and obstruction highlights the existence of a general context of impunity; f) it is clear that, from the high spheres of the State - the Executive, the Congress of the Republic and the Supreme Court of Justice - the available constitutional and legal mechanisms were arranged, with abuse of power, so as to enable the alleged perpetrators and instigators to elude the administration of competent justice, obtain favorable decisions from military courts and then try to ensure, through amnesty laws, the impunity of physical perpetrators; g) military courts do not guarantee the necessary independence and impartiality to try cases involving members of the Armed Forces. Thus, characteristics like hierarchical subordination and the fact that military judges are on active duty, make it impossible to regard military courts as a true judicial system, as was verified by the Court in the Case of Durand and Ugarte v. Perú and has been acknowledged within domestic jurisdiction by the Constitutional Court; h) the fact that the military judges were prejudiced when trying the events of La Cantuta was later confirmed by the proceedings brought against them in ordinary courts; i) the prosecution of those responsible by military courts prevented the alleged victims' next of kin from being heard by a competent court. The investigation of the case by criminal military courts also stopped the next of kin from having a fair trial and exercising an effective judicial remedy to duly try and punish those responsible. The same is true for intellectual perpetrators, who, despite not being favored by amnesty laws, were not held responsible for the facts pursuant to a resolution ordering dismissal without trial, rendered by a military court without taking into account the conclusive evidence showing their participation in the planning, organization and coordination of the crimes; j) granting jurisdiction to criminal military courts to hear the crimes perpetrated by members of the Army, who were already being investigated by regular criminal courts, entailed lack of respect for the principle of exceptionality and the restrictive nature of military courts, which constitutes a violation of the