80 that “the military men who were members of these tribunals were, at the same time, members of the armed forces in active duty, a requirement to be part of military tribunals[, and were thus] unable to issue an independent and impartial judgment”117 142. The Court has established that in a democratic State, the jurisdiction of military criminal courts must be restrictive and exceptional, and they must only judge military men for the commission of crimes or offences that due to their nature may affect any interest of military nature.118 In this regard, the Court has held that “when the military courts assume jurisdiction over a matter that should be heard by the ordinary courts, the right to the appropriate judge is violated, as is, a fortiori, due process, which, in turn, is intimately linked to the right of access to justice”119 For these reasons and because of the nature of the crime and the legally protected interest wronged, the military criminal courts have no competent jurisdiction to investigate or prosecute and punish the authors of these events. 143. The Criminal Chamber of the Peruvian Supreme Court settled the jurisdiction battle in favor of the military courts, which failed to meet the jurisdiction, independence and impartiality criteria discussed above and convicted some military officers for the events in the case, discharged some others and applied the amnesty laws (supra para. 80(55) and infra para. 188 and 189). In the context of impunity described earlier (supra para. 81, 92, 93, 110 and 136), together with the lack of jurisdiction to investigate this type of crimes by the military courts, it is evident for this Court that, as a result of the manipulation of legal and constitutional devices by the three branches of Government, the investigations were fraudulently referred to the military courts, which for many years hindered the investigations in the ordinary courts, which were the courts with competent jurisdiction to carry out the investigations, with the aim of securing impunity for those responsible. 144. However, it is worth noting that the State has recognized, both in the proceedings before this Court and in orders and decisions issued by its domestic courts in this and “other cases” (supra para. 41, 42, 44 and 91), the partiality of the judges of the criminal courts in the trial of the La Cantuta events; the fake prosecutions instituted against several people in order to prevent them from being tried by the ordinary courts and thus secure their impunity; and the irregularities in the proceedings. Thus, for example, in deciding over a writ of amparo [enforcement of the constitutional guarantee for protection of civil rights] filed in another case by former military officer Santiago Martín Rivas, one of the defendants convicted by the military courts (supra para. 80(54)), the Peruvian Constitutional Court held: […] in view of the circumstances of the case, there is evidence that the criminal proceedings instituted in the military courts were aimed at preventing the petitioner from being held responsible for the acts he is accused of. Such circumstances are connected to the existence of a systematic plan to promote impunity in human rights violations and crimes against humanity, particularly the acts committed by the members of the Colina Group, of which the petitioner is a member. Some examples of such systematic plan are: 117 Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte, supra note 104, para. 125. 118 Cf Case of Almonacid-Arellano et al., supra note 6, para. 131; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 3, para. 189, and Case of Palamara-Iribarne. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 167. 119 Cf. Case of Almonacid-Arellano et al., supra note 6, para. 131; Case of Palamara-Iribarne, supra note 119, para. 143 and Case of 19 Tradesmen, supra note 110, para. 167.