-67of arson.” Lastly, it absolved several of those accused of the crime of carrying weapons that are for the exclusive use of the Armed Forces, and of terrorism.”132 95(106) Pedro Hernán Ogazza Pantoja’s defense lawyer, filed an appeal for annulment against the judgment in second instance delivered by the Tribunal Nacional of December 30, 1997 (supra para. 95(105)), considering that it had incurred in alleged errors of fact owing to erroneous assessment of the only testimonial evidence, which consisted of the testimony of Rogelio de Jesús Escobar Mejía. On March 8, 2001, the Criminal Appeals Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decided not to annul the ruling that had been appealed.133 c) Continuation of investigatory measures in the ordinary criminal jurisdiction 95(107) Following the judgment of March 8, 2001 (supra para. 95(106)), the criminal proceedings continued with various measures taken by the Prosecutor General’s Office. On March 27, 2002, the 8th Prosecutor’s Office of the Delegate Prosecutor’s Unit before the criminal justices of the specialized Medellín Circuit issued a writ of prohibition. In this respect, the Prosecutor’s Office considered that: By law, the duration of the investigation prior to the existence of evidence is conditional upon the issue of a writ of prohibition or merit to consider that the accused is a party to the crime. This is left to the discretion of the Prosecutor who must define the situation based on the probative evidence obtained and the results of the investigation […] The decision on whether to open a pre-trial investigation which is left to the discretion of the Prosecutor entails a power or mechanism, such as the power to collect evidence to comply with the purpose of this investigatory stage […] Therefore, this Office, exercising this power, will not proceed to a pre-trial investigation and, instead, will proceed to issue a writ of prohibition, because, in the first place, unidentified persons must be investigated, since those implicated have not been named, and since the witnesses cannot provide any new evidence about the reported fact. This Office observes that when generalizations are made without any specifics, without directly accusing anyone, and when the pre-trial investigation is prolonged indefinitely, the principle of human dignity is affected. We have examined the case file carefully and find there is insufficient evidence to accuse anyone in particular for the authorship of the facts that have been reported, because new co-participants have not been identified or individualized, three years after the opening of the pre-trial investigation and, especially, when the accused who have been identified have already been tried and sentenced. Hence, in these circumstances, it is inadmissible for this Office to continue indefinitely with this preliminary stage without supervening evidence. However, we will be attentive to any of the victims coming forward some time in the future to denounce a specific individual who has not been prosecuted and convicted, as a perpetrator or participant in the facts investigated […]134 95(108) On September 17, 2002, ASFADDES requested the Coordination Office of the Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office to take over the investigation of the events that occurred in Pueblo 132 Cf. judgment of the Sentencing Chamber of the Tribunal Nacional of December 30, 1997 (file of attachments to the application brief, tome II, attachment C3, folios 417 to 480). 133 Cf. appeal judgment of March 8, 2001, of the Criminal Appeals Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (file of attachments to the application, tome II, attachment C4, folios 481 to 508). 134 Cf. writ of prohibition of March 27, 2002, issued by the 8th Prosecutor’s Office of the Delegate Prosecutor’s Unit before the criminal justices of the specialized Medellín Circuit (file of attachments to the requests and arguments brief, tome V, attachment 7(4), folios 1648 to 1650).