-93structures was ignored; once again, this characteristic is a guarantee of certainty, because, in this way, not only is the protection of the treaty-based rights maximized, but also the events that involve the State’s international responsibility are verified. Certainty is also a confirmed right of the State.195 116. In this respect, the Court has already established that, at the international level, State responsibility under the American Convention can only be required after the State has had the opportunity to repair the damage it has caused. Moreover, the attribution of international responsibility to a State owing to the acts of State agents or individuals must be determined on the basis of the characteristics and circumstances of each case,196 and also on the corresponding special obligations of prevention and protection that are applicable. Although this attribution is made on the basis of international law, the many different forms and characteristics that the facts may assume in situations that violate human rights makes it almost illusory to expect international law to define specifically – or rigorously or numerus clausus – all the hypotheses or situations – or structures – for attributing to the State each of the possible and eventual acts or omissions of State agents or individuals. 117. Thus, when interpreting and applying the Convention, the Court must pay attention to the special needs for protection of the individual, the ultimate beneficiary of the provisions of the respective treaty. Owing to the nature erga omnes of the State’s treaty-based protection obligations, their scope cannot be determined on the basis of a vision that focuses on the sovereign will of the States and merely on the effects of inter-State relations. These obligations devolve upon all subjects of international law and presumptions of non-compliance must be determined in function of the need for protection in each particular case. 118. Having indicated the State’s obligations under the Convention and the general principles for attribution of international responsibility to the State, the Court will proceed to examine the possible violation of the rights to personal liberty, humane treatment and life of the alleged victims and their next of kin, in the context of the obligations of prevention, protection and investigation arising from Article 1(1) of the Convention in relation to the norms that embody these rights: Articles 7, 5 and 4 thereof. b) The obligations of prevention and protection of the right to personal liberty, humane treatment and life of the alleged victims 119. The rights to life and to humane treatment are central to the Convention. According to Article 27(2) of the said treaty, these rights form part of the nonderogable nucleus, because they are established as rights that cannot be suspended in case of war, public danger or other threats to the independence or security of the States Parties. 120. This Court has indicated that the right to life plays a fundamental role in the American Convention, as it is the essential corollary for realizing the other rights.197 195 Cf. final written arguments presented by the State (merits file, tome IV, pp. 17, 18 and 32, folios 898, 899 and 913). 196 197 Cf. Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre”, supra note 7, para. 113. Cf. Case of the 19 Merchants. Judgment of July 5 , 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 153 citing the Case of Myrna Mack Chang, Judgment of November 25, 2003, Series C No. 101, para. 152; Case of Juan