Regarding the assertion in the Judgment, of the admissibility of the petition as regards the detention conditions and the deterioration in health or, as the Commission refers to them, the detention conditions and the lack of medical attention, 39 it can also be maintained that, as the Judgment itself infers, 40 all the facts gathered under this heading occurred in the context of the criminal proceedings, as is revealed by the circumstance that the requests concerning these aspects made by the detainee or his representatives were sent to the judge who was hearing the case. 41 It can also be stated that these requests, as in the case of the others, were mere administrative measures and not real remedies. These reasons would have been sufficient to declare admissible the objection filed by the State regarding non-compliance with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies and inadmissible, consequently, the petition also as regards the detention conditions and the deterioration in health. But, to this should be added, with all the more reason, that the facts of the case are that several of the said requests were admitted, that “it is a proven fact that, following the adoption of the precautionary measures, his physical detention conditions gradually improved” 42 and that, consequently, the detainee received medical attention.43 Therefore, the assertion made in the Judgment that, although “the State cannot be blamed for the fact that, when presenting its observations on the petition, it made no specific reference to the available remedies,” an “important exception” existed in this regard “that will be mentioned when analyzing the aspect regarding the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health.” 44 And, this is difficult to understand because, when referring to this aspect the Judgment merely indicates that “[t]he situation is different as regards the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health” and that, “[c]onsequently, the exception to the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46)(2)(a) of the American Convention is applicable,” so that, without further explanation, it ends by rejecting “the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies filed by the State as regards the detention conditions and the deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health.” 45 The Judgment does not support this. It does not indicate why that “situation” was “different” or why, even though “the Commission had not yet explained the division of the different aspects of the case into three parts, the State could not ignore that, in this regard, it should have referred to precise and opportune remedies.” Nor does it throw any light on the reason why it reproaches the State for not having indicated “the remedies that could have been filed to obtain an improvement in the poor detention conditions that were alleged and to prevent the consequent deterioration in Mr. Díaz Peña’s health that was alleged.” And what is even more striking is that it concludes presuming, without providing any explanation either, that “there were no remedies to be exhausted.” 46 Since the statement made in the Judgment is contradictory and, all things considered, does not provide the arguments that would justify it, it is not comprehensible, and sows doubt as regards why the Court did not apply to this aspect of the petition at least the same consideration as it provided to the others 39 Para. 126. 40 Paras. 91 to 108. 41 Para. 103. 42 Para. 94. 43 Paras. 100 to 107. 44 Para. 122. 45 Paras. 126 and 127. 46 Para. 125. 9