35 effective guarantee of his right to a defense. The above is a violation to Articles 8(2)(b), (c), (d), and (e) of the Convention; and f) Mr. Acosta Calderon was not informed of his right to be assisted by consulate officials from his country of origin or nationality. CONSIDERATIONS OF THE COURT a) Regarding the principle of a reasonable time-period for the criminal process against Mr. Acosta Calderon. 103. Article 8(1) of the American Convention states that: 1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 104. The reasonability of the time period referred to in this precept must be analyzed with regard to the total duration of the process, from the first procedural act up to the issuing of a definitive judgment, including the recourses that could be presented.74 In this sense, the Court has ruled that, in criminal matters, the term starts on the date of the arrest of the individual.75 Mr. Acosta Calderón’s arrest occurred on November 15, 1989. Therefore, the time period must be counted as of that moment. Mr. Acosta Calderón was convicted on December 8, 1994 (supra para. 50(43)). 105. To examine the reasonability of this process pursuant to the terms of Article 8(1) of the Convention, the Court takes into account three elements: a) the complexity of the matter, b) the procedural activity of the interested party, and c) the behavior of the judicial authorities.76 106. The case was not complex. There was not a plurality of procedural subjects. From the case file we cannot infer that Mr. Acosta Calderón acted in any way to delay the cause. From the evidence in this case we can conclude that the delay of more than five years in the processing of the case was due to the judicial authority’s behavior. The case file included documents that had no relationship whatsoever with the process, which demonstrates a lack of care. It seems that Mr. Acosta Calderón’s statement, if there ever was one, was lost and was taken two years after the court order for the investigation of the alleged crime on November 15, 1989. What is even more serious is that the procedure of proving if the substance that led to the arrest and processing of Mr. Acosta Calderón was or wasn’t a controlled substance, essential to constitute the crime, was never carried out, even though it was first ordered by the Judge on November 29, 1989, because the substance was not found by the corresponding authority (supra paras. 50(7) and 50(36)) 74 Cfr. Case of Tibi, supra note 6, para. 168; and Case of Suárez Rosero, supra note 60, para. 70. 75 Cfr. Case of Tibi, supra note 6, para. 168; Case of Suárez Rosero, supra note 60, para. 70; and in the same sense, Henning v. Austria, No. 41444/98, para. 32, ECHR 2003-I; and Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaid v. France, 23043/93, para. 93, ECHR 1998-II. 76 Cfr. Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra note 2, para. 67; Case of Tibi, supra note 6, para. 175; and Case of Ricardo Canese. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 141.