11 improperly processed and the minimum judicial guarantees not observed. Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo was tried both in the military and civil court systems by "faceless judges" who were neither independent nor impartial." Also, Ms. Loayza was charged with treason, governed by Decree-Law Nº 25.659, which provides that persons accused of that crime must be tried in the military courts, thereby submitting civilians to trial by a military court, which is a special jurisdiction. That this regulation "patently fails to observe the guarantees of due process and the right to be tried by a competent civil court". The Commission also claimed that the defense "became a mere spectator to the proceedings. The case was based on evidence obtained through coercion, intimidation tactics used against the defense counsel, obstruction of counsel's access to the case file, grossly tardy notifications, etc". b. The principle of "full procedural equality" or parity was also violated, as was the right to be presumed innocent. Further, it was the National Police, DINCOTE, that defined the crime which allegedly had occurred, and that DINCOTE has the faculty to decide which jurisdictions and courts are competent to try a case. According to the Commission, this resulted in Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo being tried for the same acts in different courts for the same cause, with the consequent violation of the principle of non bis in idem. Certain facts which were not proven by the military jurisdiction were attributed to Ms. Loayza-Tamayo. The Commission also alleges that Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo's second trial in the civil courts on the charge of terrorism was based on allegations founded on the very same facts. c. In its brief of closing arguments the Commission drew attention to the inconsistency of Peru's claim that Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo's detention "was not the result of Angélica Torres-García's false accusations. Moreover, since she is not a 'repentant' terrorist, there was no need to go through the verification process required under the Ley de Arrepentimiento (Law of Repentance)," while it had claimed the opposite in Police Report Nº 049-DIVICOTE 3-DINCOTE and other documents. d. That the faceless Special Tribunal of the civil jurisdiction, through its Judgment of October 10, 1994, convicted Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo of the crime of terrorism for sheltering two persons whom the faceless tribunal described as Shining Path "elements", and not because terrorist propaganda had been found in the property in which she was arrested. The Commission further contended that it was untrue that "the policemen who entered the building found 'sufficient evidence' for María Elena Loayza-Tamayo to be charged with 'the crime of terrorism'", and that had such been the case, there would be no reason to prosecute her on a charge of treason in three different branches of the military court system. e. Regarding the argument adduced by the State at the public hearing held on September 23, 1995, that Ms. María Elena Loayza-Tamayo had every opportunity to file an action of guarantee "to claim her release on the ground that she had been acquitted of the charge of treason," the Commission considered it to constitute a clear admission of unlawful deprivation of liberty. At the same time, it averred that such a guarantee could not be invoked because Decree-Law Nº 25.659 (relating to treason) impeded her access to the remedy of "amparo" or habeas corpus at that time. f. With regard to the claim of double jeopardy, the Commission believes it to be false that when the Special Supreme Military Tribunal of the Supreme Court of