98 the boards of directors of trade union organisations, and of public servant associations; their delegates and trade union or sectoral representatives, directors of public servant associations regardless of whether or not they enjoy trade union powers or whether or not they are governed by special laws. (The italics are not from the original). 156. In considering whether or not, in the case in question, there was violation of the freedom of association, it must be analysed in relationship with labour union freedom. In labour union matters, freedom of association consists basically of the ability to constitute labour union organisations, and to set into motion their internal structure, activities and action programme, without any intervention by the public authorities that could limit or impair the exercise of the respective right. On the other hand, under such freedom it is possible to assume that each person may determine, without any pressure, whether or not she or he wishes to form part of the association. This matter, therefore, is about the basic right to constitute a group for the pursuit of a lawful goal, without pressure or interference that may alter or denature its objective. 157. The Preamble of the ILO Constitution includes the “recognition of the principle of freedom of association” as an indispensable requirement for the attainment of “universal and lasting peace.”59 158. This Court feels that, in trade union matters, freedom of association is of the utmost importance for the defence of the legitimate interests of the workers, and falls under the corpus juris of human rights. 159. In labour matters, and pursuant to the terms of Article 16 of the American Convention, freedom of association includes a right and a freedom, to wit: the right to form associations without restrictions other than those permitted according to sections 2 and 3 of that conventional precept, and the freedom of all persons not to be compelled or forced to join the association. The November 17, 1988, San Salvador Protocol, in its Article 8(3), contains the same idea, and specifies that, in trade union matters “[n]o one may be obliged to belong to a labour union.” 160. The entirety of the evidence in the instant case shows that, in dismissing the State workers, labour union leaders who were working on a number of claims were dismissed. In addition, the members or workers organisations were dismissed for acts that were not causes for dismissal according to the legislation in force at the time of the events. This proves that the intention in making Law 25 retroactive in compliance with orders from the Executive Branch, was to provide a basis for the massive dismissal of public sector trade union leaders and workers, such actions doubtlessly limiting the possibilities for action of the trade union organisations in the cited sector. 161. At the public hearing on the merits, held at the seat of the Court, the witness who was Attorney General of the Nation from December 1990 to November 1991, expressed that “very clear signals could be seen, indicating that the Government wanted [for them to] involve the trade union leaders,” and that “such messages were received [by them] in different manners,” through “semi-official messengers” (This translator's version of the quotations). On the same occasion, the expert Humberto Ricord, an attorney-at –law and a specialist in labour and constitutional 59 cfr. also ILO. Convention 87 Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, of June 17, 1948, and Convention 98 Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, of June 8, 1949.