nevertheless, the independence recognized to prosecutors constitutes the guarantee that they will not be subject to political pressure or undue interference in their actions, or reprisals for the decisions that they have objectively taken, and this requires, specifically, the guarantee of tenure or irremovability from office.60 Thus, this specific guarantee for prosecutors, applied in the same way as the protection mechanisms recognized for judges results in the following: (i) that removal from office is exclusively due to the permitted causes, either by a proceeding that complies with judicial guarantees or because the mandate has ended; (ii) that prosecutors can only be dismissed because of serious disciplinary offenses or incompetence, and (iii) that any process against prosecutors must be settled using fair, objective and impartial proceedings, pursuant to the Constitution or the law, because the discretionary removal of prosecutors gives rise to the objective doubt about their real possibility of exercising their functions without fear of reprisals.61 B.2. The guarantee of tenure for provisional prosecutors 81. The Court reiterates that it does not have competence to define the best institutional framework for ensuring the independence and objectivity of prosecutors. 62 However, it notes that States are bound to ensure that provisional prosecutors are independent and objective, and therefore should grant them some sort of stability and permanence in office, because the fact that they are appointed provisionally does not mean that they can be removed from office in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.63 The Court notes that the provisional nature of the appointment should not modify in any way the safeguards instituted to guarantee the reliable performance of their functions and to benefit the litigants themselves. In any case, such provisional appointments should not be prolonged indefinitely and should be subject to a resolutive condition, such as the extinction of the case that resulted in the temporary absence or separation of the incumbent, or the expiry of a predetermined period and the holding and conclusion of a public competitive selection procedure whereby permanent replacements are 1 and 4 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (viii) Republic of Panama, Public Prosecution Service (Article 140 of the Constitution); (ix) Republic of Paraguay, Public Prosecution Service (Articles 266 of the Constitution and 6 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (x) Republic of Peru, Public Prosecution Service (Articles 158 of the Constitution and 5 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service), and (xi) Dominican Republic, Public Prosecution Service (Article 170 of the Constitution); (2) States in which the institution, with a hierarchical structure and with functional autonomy, forms part of the Judiciary: (i) Republic of Colombia, Office of the Prosecutor General (Articles 249 of the Constitution and 4 of Decree Law 016 of 2014); (ii) Republic of Costa Rica, Public Prosecution Service (Article 2 of the Organic Law of the Public Prosecution Service); (iii) Republic of Ecuador, Office of the Prosecutor General (Article 194 of the Constitution and 282 of the Organic Code of the Judicial Function), and (iv) Republic of Suriname, Public Prosecution Service (Articles 133 and 146 of the Constitution); (3) State in which the institution and its members are under the authority of the Executive Branch: Republic of Haiti, Public Prosecution Service (Article 35 of the Law on the Statute of the Judiciary); (4) States in which there are autonomous institutions and the functional or professional independence of prosecutors in the exercise of their functions is recognized: (i) Federative Republic of Brazil, National Public Prosecution Service (Article 127 of the Constitution), and (ii) United Mexican States, Office of the Prosecutor General (Articles 102 of the Constitution and 12 of the Organic Law of the Prosecutor General’s Office), and (5) State in which the functions are exercised by a decentralized institution with functional autonomy and with recognition of professional independence of prosecutors in the exercise of their functions: (i) Oriental Republic of Uruguay (Articles 1 of Law No. 19334 and 5 of Law No. 19483). Cf. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/19, June 7, 2012, para. 33: “[…] Within a horizontal structure, prosecutors generally enjoy more autonomy, while within a hierarchical structure, it is easier to align the application and interpretation of the law as well as a common approach to criminal justice policy, since there will be an objective, in the name of consistency, to ensure that common practices, procedures and policies are followed. […] In order to maintain their autonomy in hierarchically structured prosecution services, prosecutors should not be required to obtain approval for their actions in the exercise of their functions. […].” 60 61 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 96. 62 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 97. 63 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 97. 23