8(1) of the Convention. 92. In this specific case, the resolutions issued by the administrative authority to justify its decision to terminate the appointment indicate that the permanence of Mr. Casa Nina in the post of provisional prosecutor depended on what, in the administrative authority’s opinion, was required and determined by “the needs for the service.”82 Thus, the said authority was empowered to decide in a discretionary manner when the institution would be able to dispense with his work as a provisional prosecutor and, consequently, decide on the termination of his designation or appointment.83 93. In the Court’s opinion, the justification of the needs for the service invoked to remove Mr. Casa Nina denotes the application of an indeterminate legal concept; namely, one relating to an aspect of reality the limits of which were not clearly established by this expression. The application of this concept should respond to concrete circumstances clearly stated by the authority. Invoking the needs for the service does not merely entail mentioning the said expression; rather it should introduce a reasoned analysis of the specific circumstances involved. 94. In this regard, the Court understands that States may enjoy the prerogative of adapting the regime of their officials to the needs for their service in response to the principles of efficacy and efficiency. However, the standard of the needs for the service is too indeterminate to justify the termination of a provisional appointment that should have certain guarantees of stability. Consequently, the justification of the needs for the service does not provide a sufficient degree of predictability to be considered a resolutive condition;84 therefore, as indicated previously (supra para. 91), the decision that terminated the appointment did not respond to the causes permitted in order to safeguard the independence of the provisional prosecutor in the performance of his functions. 95. It is worth pointing out that, although it has not been established that Mr. Casa Nina was in fact subject to pressures or interference of any type during the performance of his functions as a prosecutor, the discretionary removal of prosecutors raises objective doubts about the real possibility they have of performing their functions and taking decisions without fear of reprisals.85 The witness Rita Arleny Figueroa Vásquez stated, with regard to the conditions for Mr. Casa Nina’s execution of the function, that “the resolutions designating him in the post that he temporarily occupied in the Public Prosecution Service contained a tacit resolutive condition: his permanence in the institution depended on the ‘needs for the service.’” And, she added the following: “[…] the ‘need’ for the service is the reason for a designation by the Public Prosecution Service. Thus, the provisional nature of (non-career) provisional prosecutors is regulated by the principle of need, according to which the (non-career) provisional prosecutor occupies a vacancy while the need for the service exists. Therefore, the permanence in office of (non-career) provisional prosecutors depends on the need for the service, among other matters. That said, according to the principle of transience, the termination of the function occurs when there is no need for the service or no budgetary viability.” Cf. Statement made by Rita Arleny Figueroa Vásquez (evidence file, volume VI, affidavits, folios 1255 and 1258). 82 Even though the State argued that the presumed victim, in his capacity as a provisional prosecutor and, in general, provisional prosecutors in Peru “are not removed on a discretionary basis,” the Court cannot help but conclude otherwise based on the evidence provided, the proven facts, and the arguments submitted, especially when the State itself asserted in its answering brief that “the resolution terminating a posting is a faculty of the employer – the Public Prosecution Service headed by the Prosecutor General – to conclude the designation if he/she considers this pertinent.” In addition, in the answering brief the State argued that “when the need for the service ends, automatically and pursuant to the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor General, the designation of a non-career provisional prosecutor is terminated.” 83 84 Cf. Case of Martínez Esquivia v. Colombia, supra, para. 110. Cf. Mutatis mutandis, Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 44; Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 78; Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C No. 227, para. 99; Case of the Supreme Court of Justice 85 27