19. This rule includes four means of interpretation.32 One is the method based on good faith, which means that what was agreed by the States Parties to the treaty concerned should be understood based on what they effectively had the intention of agreeing to so that it is truly applied and has practical effects. In this regard, good faith is closely related to the “pacta sunt servanda” principle.33 The second, is the textual or literal method, which refers to the analysis of the text of the treaty, the wording used, and the ordinary meaning of its terms. The third is the subjective method that seeks to establish the intention of the States Parties to the treaty by analyzing the travaux préparatoires and the subsequent conduct of the States Parties with regard to the treaty. And the forth is the functional or teleological method that seeks to determine the object and purpose of the treaty. Since these four means of interpretation are included in the same phrase, forming a single rule, they should be applied simultaneously and harmoniously, without preferring or downplaying one or the other. This is the main characteristic that distinguishes the interpretation of treaties from that of other norms.34 20. Regarding the special rule established in Article 29 of the Convention,35 known as the pro personae principle, it should be recalled that this is a rule relating to the interpretation of the Convention, and mandating that, in that exercise, the meaning and scope that is understood cannot permit a limitation of the human right that the Convention ensures or that is recognized by the other legal instruments it indicates. Therefore, this article obliges the Court to interpret the rights ensure in the Convention with the broadest meaning and scope established in this instrument or in other applicable legal instruments. 32 Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention: “General rule of interpretation. “1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 2. “The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.” 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” 33 Supra, footnote 15. As in the case of article 19 of the Civil Code of Chile: “When the meaning of the law is clear, its literal meaning should not be ignored, on the pretext of consulting its spirit. However, to interpret an obscure expression of the law, it is possible to have recourse to its intention or spirit, clearly apparent in it, or to the reliable history of its creation.” 34 35 “Restrictions Regarding Interpretation. No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: (a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; (b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; (c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government, or (d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 7