instant case, to refer to them, even though the corresponding judgment did not include any reference in this regard. A. Good faith 34. According to the method based on good faith, it is more than evident that the practical effect of this rule is that the States Parties to the Convention should truly adopted measures, both in the domestic sphere and also in the area of international cooperation, to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights derived from the standards of the OAS Charter, and all of this subject to available resources. Thus the State obligation established in Article 26 is to adopt measures to make the said rights effective and not that they really are in effect. The obligation is one of conduct, not of results. This obligation could not be otherwise, when it depends on two factors: available resources and international cooperation, which are beyond the control of the State concerned. 35. In this regard, attention must be drawn to the fact that the provisions of Article 26 are similar to those of Article 2 of the Convention; namely, in the latter, the States are obliged to adopt measures where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 of the Convention are not already ensured 50 and, in the former, to adopt measures in order to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights that it mentions derived from the standards set forth in the OAS Charter. However, the two articles differ in that the latter conditions compliance with its provisions to international cooperation and the availability of the corresponding resources. 36. Based on the foregoing, it is necessary to reflect on the reason why Article 26 was adopted and, therefore, why the rights that it refers to were not addressed in the same way as the civil and political rights. Based on good faith, the answer can only be that the Convention considered that both types of human rights – although closely linked owing to the ideal to which they aspire, which is, according to its Preamble, to create the conditions that permit their “enjoyment”51 – are, however, different and, in particular, have been developed differently in the sphere of public international law, so that they required a differentiated treatment, which is precisely what the Convention does as also indicated in its Preamble. 52 37. Therefore, based on the principle of good faith, it is necessary to underline that although the Preamble to the Convention affirms that “everyone should enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights,” this does not mean – as the judgment asserts – that the practical effect of Article 26 is that the violations of the rights it mentions are justiciable before the Court, but merely that the States must adopt the pertinent measures, including through international cooperation, and subject to the available resources, to realize the said rights progressively. 50 Art. 2: “Domestic Legal Effects. Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”. Para. 4: “Reiterating that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.” 51 Preambular para. 5: “Considering that the Third Special Inter-American Conference (Buenos Aires, 1967) approved the incorporation into the Charter of the Organization itself of broader standards with respect to economic, social, and educational rights and resolved that an inter-American convention on human rights should determine the structure, competence, and procedure of the organs responsible for these matters.” 52 11