38. Additionally, it is essential to note that it is surprising that the judgment has not referred more extensively to good faith as an element that is as essential as the others established in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention for the interpretation of treaties. Likewise, it is also strange that it has not provided any explanation of the inclusion of Article 26 in a separate chapter from the political and civil rights and, in particular, what are its fundamental purpose and its practical effect. The judgment provides no answers with regard to the reason for the existence of Article 26 as a different article from those established for the civil and political rights. 39. In sum, good faith leads to considering Article 26 on its own merits, which means that it should be interpreted not as recognizing rights that it does not list or describe, as in the instant case, but rather as referring to norms other than those of the Convention for more complete information on such rights, such as those of the OAS Charter. Consequently, its special and practical effect is, let me repeat, that the States Parties to the Convention should adopt measures to achieve progressively the rights derived from those norms, and all of this subject to international cooperation and the available resources. 40. The judgment omits any reference to good faith and diverges markedly from what the Vienna Convention establishes in this regard in relation to the interpretation of treaties. B. Literal meaning 41. When interpreting Article 26 in light of its literal or ordinary meaning, it can be concluded that this article: i. is to be found, as the only article, in Chapter III, entitled “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,”53 of Part I, entitled “State Obligations and Rights Protected,” which also includes Chapter I “General Obligations,” and Chapter II “Civil and Political Rights”; consequently, it can be seen from this that it is the Convention itself that, contrary to what the Court has considered in its case law,54 considers the civil and political rights separately from the economic, social and cultural rights, making a clear distinction between them, by providing a special and differentiated consideration to each of them; ii. does not list or provide details or specify the rights to which it alludes; it merely identifies them as those derived55 “from the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the” OAS; in other words, rights that can be understood or inferred from56 the latter’s provisions; iii. ergo, it unambiguously does not recognize the rights referred to and does not ensure their exercise, as the Convention does [in the case of the civil and political rights]; iv. it does not make such rights effective or enforceable, because if it had wished to do so, it would have stated this directly and without any ambiguity; in other words, contrary to the Court’s case law, there is no “reference with a sufficient degree of specificity to the Chapter IV of Part I is entitled “Suspension of Guarantees, Interpretation and Application” and Chapter V is entitled “Personal Responsibilities.” 53 Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2017. Series C No. 340, para. 141. 54 “Derivar: Dicho de una cosa: Traer su origen de otra.” Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Española, 2020 55 56 “Inferir: Deducir algo o sacarlo como conclusión de otra cosa”, Idem. 12