the economic, social and cultural rights to which the Preamble of the Convention refers is to the “enjoyment” of both types of human rights and not that they should be subject to the same rules for their exercise and international monitoring. 52. It is also necessary to bear in mind that, regarding what Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention considers as context, there is no “agreement relating to the [Convention] which was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” or “any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the” Convention and “accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to” it. 53. Nor does there exist, together with the context, as established by Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation” of the Convention “or the application of its provisions” or “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation,” except for the Protocol of San Salvador. 54. Consequently, it is not acceptable that, in the absence of what is known in legal doctrine as the “authentic interpretation,” the meaning and scope of the Convention are determined by the Court unrelated, and even in contradiction, to what was agreed by its States Parties. The Convention, as every treaty, does not exist outside of what the latter expressly agreed. 55. In support of its decision, the judgment mentions Article XIV of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 29(d) of the Convention, and General Comment No. 18 on the right to work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Regarding the first, it should be pointed out that, logically, it does not establish the justiciability before the Court of the right to work because, at the date of the Declaration, the Court did not exist. 56. Regarding the second, it is necessary to insist that it refers to the interpretation of the Convention that could limit or exclude the enjoyment and exercise or the effects of human rights recognized in the Convention, which is not the case of the rights derived from the OAS Charter. Moreover, neither does it refer to the justiciability of the right to work. 57. Lastly, regarding the reference to the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, this is a body composed of 18 independent experts. In other words, it is not formed of State representatives and, moreover, it oversees the application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by its States parties. Consequently, it bears no relationship to the Convention and thus it cannot possibly establish the justiciability before the Court of the right to work and, evidently, does not do so. In addition, it should be added that the comments of the said Committee constitute an aspiration, which is entirely legitimate, of change or development of the relevant international law. 58. Therefore, it is irrefutable that none of the texts cited – let me repeat, none – involves or establishes that presumed violations of the right to work, or of any of the other economic, social and cultural rights derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the OAS Charter can be submitted to the Court for it to rule on them. 59. It is necessary to add to the foregoing that nor do the references in the judgment to the domestic law of the State74 justify its thesis that they provide authorization to have recourse to the Court for violations of the rights mentioned above. The Court’s competence is 74 Para. 105. 16