Right to have an appeal heard by judges free from outside influence and government manipulation (Article 7(2); Right to be detained in a manner consistent with standards that prohibit cruel or unusual punishment (Article 5 and the Decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights rendered on September 17, 1997, in the case of Loayza Tamayo); Right to habeas corpus before an independent court (Articles 7.6 and 25). III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 7. On February 11, 1998, the Commission forwarded the pertinent parts of the petition to the State, which responded that the complaint should be declared inadmissible because the remedies available under domestic jurisdiction had not been exhausted. IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS A. Competence of the Commission 8. Peru is a State Party to the American Convention on Human Rights which it ratified on July 28, 1978. The petition alleges violations to human rights established in the aforesaid treaty, which the Commission is competent to examine. B. Admissibility of the petition 1. Exhaustion of domestic remedies 9. In their submission, the petitioners maintain that the sentence handed down by the Supreme Military Court against Lori Berenson is final. They point out that the sentence of the lower court was appealed to a higher military court, which dismissed the appeal. Lori Berenson subsequently filed another appeal with the Supreme Military Court, which also upheld the decision. Lastly, the alleged victim lodged an appeal for review of the final decision, which was also denied. 10. The petitioners claim that pursuant to Article 6 of Decree Law 25659 subsequently amended by Article 2 of Decree Law 26248, a final sentence cannot be examined by a civilian court. According to the attorneys, the standards mentioned stipulate that actions for Amparo(protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution but violated by the judicial or executive branch) are to be heard by the same military personnel, who initiated the original proceedings. 11. The argument put forward by the petitioners seems to be corroborated by statements made by the Supreme Council of Military Justice which ruled that Lori Berenson may not have a new trial in a civil court "because that would violate the constitutional principle of res judicata and the protection of sentences handed down by military courts".1 12. Nonetheless, in its response to the petition, the State contended that the petitioners had not exhausted all domestic remedies. In this regard, it merely stated that "the petitioner at the end of the trial was entitled to file an action of `amparo' for alleged violation of the guarantees of due process. However, the petitioner preferred not to avail herself of this remedy, which constitutes an omission not covered by the American Convention and the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR and cannot be taken as a presumption of admissibility based on procedure. It is important to note that such an omission does not mean that the said remedy had been exhausted." 13. In its communication, the State fails to explain why such remedy is considered effective, given that the case in question involves a conviction upheld by two higher military courts. Nor does the State refute the petitioners' contention that under the law the remedy of "amparo" would need to be brought before the same military courts that had decided the case. 1 Republica, July 29 or 30, 1998. 2