29 150. Even if the story of a struggle with another youth and of an “accidental” shot being fired that killed the child García Ibarra was true, there is not a single element in that version of the events that would justify the police officer’s recourse to violence by pistol whipping an unarmed youth who was, as has been established, physically weakened as a result of the surgery he had recently undergone. Assuming for the sake of argument that the police officer’s version of the events is true, the use of a lethal means like a firearm to beat an unarmed and physically debilitated youth posed a risk that the firearm might discharge and injure others nearby –including three teenagers whom the police officer had a special duty to protect. This alone is sufficient to conclude that the police officer did not act with the due diligence and caution that the principles of last resort, necessity and proportionality dictate. This assertion is consistent with the conviction ultimately upheld in the domestic courts, which found that José Luis García Ibarra’s death was the result of the police officer’s lack of foresight and caution. 151. One more element indicative of the police officer’s irregular conduct is the fact that he immediately fled the scene. The Commission considers that this conduct does not comport with a legitimate use of force in the exercise of one’s authority under the constitution and the law. 152. The testimonial statements that support the two versions described in the section on findings of fact differ on two basic points: the question of whether any struggle occurred between the police officer and another youth at the scene of the events, and the question of whether the shot that caused José Luís García Ibarra’s death was fired accidentally or intentionally. The Commission need not settle this debate, as it is not relevant to determining whether the police officer’s use of force was a legitimate use of force and, by extension, whether the deprivation of life was or was not arbitrary in the sense of Article 4 of the Convention. As previously observed, this analysis examines compliance with the principles of last resort, necessity and proportionality. Here, the IACHR has already concluded that in the instant case, those requirements were not satisfied. 153. Finally, the Commission notes that at various times during the internal investigation, the police officer refers to the adolescents as a group of gang members. The Inter-American Court has already referred to this issue, saying that: "the State cannot allow that its agents, nor can it promote in the society practices that reproduce the stigma that poor children and youngsters are conditioned to delinquency, or necessarily related to the increase in public insecurity. That stigmatization creates a climate propitious so that those minors in risky situations are constantly facing the threat that their lives and freedom 98 be illegally restrained. 154. Based on the above considerations, the Commission concludes that the State of Ecuador violated the right to life and the right of the child to special protection, established in articles 4 and 19 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with the obligation to respect and ensure the Conventionprotected rights, established in Article 1(1) of that instrument, to the detriment of José Luís García Ibarra. In the next section, the Commission will examine whether the State complied with its obligation to investigate, prosecute, punish and redress these violations. 98 I/A Court H. R., Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, par. 112.