3 that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration …, or by a special agreement. Similarly, Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that the “jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it”, as well as others not here relevant, and in Article 36(2) and (3) specifies formal declarations and special agreements as the ordinary means of accepting jurisdiction, likewise without designating them to be the exclusive such means. 7. Equally, nothing in the Rules of either Court “precludes” acceptance of jurisdiction based on the principle of forum prorogatum. Article 33(1) of the Rules of Procedure of this Court does not include any requirement that a basis of jurisdiction be articulated in an application to it. The “brief containing the application shall indicate” only the parties to the case; the purpose of the application; a statement of the facts; the supporting evidence, specifying the facts on which they will bear; the particulars of the witnesses and expert witnesses; the legal arguments, and the conclusions reached …. Only after the modern advent12 of the principle of forum prorogatum were the Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice amended to include in Article 38(2) the requirement that “[t]he application shall specify as far as possible the legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction of the Court is said to be based”. (Emphasis added.) That the phrase “as far as possible” was intended, as Rosenne confirms,13 as a desideratum only, leaving intact the principle of forum prorogatum, is obvious from the provision of Article 38(5) setting out the administrative procedures to be followed when “the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent thereto yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such application is made …” 8. Finally, as litigants before the International Court of Justice relying on the principle of forum prorogatum have been quick to point out, that principle is compatible with, if not actually mandated by, the rule laid down in Article 36(3) of the Charter of the United Nations “that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice,” which in turn is a specific application of the broader imperative, recorded in Article 1(1) of the Charter, “to bring about by peaceful means … adjustment or settlement of international disputes …”14 9. I appreciate that this Court, so far as its jurisprudence indicates, never heretofore has addressed, or been called upon to address, the possibility of its being a forum prorogatum. That being the case, a certain reticence to do so now, when it does not appear to be necessary, is understandable. Caution no doubt is appropriate, as a general matter, given that the principle is not without its critics.15 I 12 Rosenne (p. 696) traces the principle to Roman law. 13 Rosenne, pp. 702 – 705. See, e.g., Ambatielos Case and Anglo – Iranian Oil Co. Case as discussed by Rosenne, pp. 708 – 14 712. 15 Thus Rosenne, albeit referring to the highly “political” Anglo – Iranian Case Oil Co., in which the Security Council also was involved, observes (p. 711):