48 free and full exercise of the rights of all persons under the jurisdiction of a State, and it requires that the latter take such steps as may be necessary to punish deprivation of the right to life and other human rights violations, as well as to prevent abridgment of any of these rights by its own security forces or by third parties acting with its acquiescence.69 112. This Court has repeatedly stated that the obligation to investigate must be carried out “in all seriousness and not as a mere formality, destined beforehand to be fruitless.”70 The investigation conducted by the State to comply with this obligation “[m]ust have a purpose and be undertaken by [it] as a juridical obligation of its own and not as a mere processing of private interests, subject to procedural initiative of the victim or his or her next of kin or to evidence privately supplied, without the public authorities effectively seeking the truth.”71 113. The Court notes that since May 23, 1996, the date on which the defense counsel was notified of the request by the public prosecutor of a 15 year prison sentence against Police Captain Espósito, for the reiterated crime of aggravated illegal imprisonment, the defense counsel for the accused filed a large number of diverse legal questions and remedies (requests for postponement, challenges, incidental pleas, objections, motions on lack of jurisdiction, requests for annulment, among others), which have not allowed the proceedings to progress toward their natural culmination, which has given rise to a plea for extinguishment of the criminal action. 114. This manner of exercising the means that the law makes available to the defense counsel has been tolerated and allowed by the intervening judiciary bodies, forgetting that their function is not exhausted by enabling due process that guarantees defense at a trial, but that they must also ensure, within a reasonable time,72 the right of the victim or his or her next of kin to learn the truth about what happened and for those responsible to be punished. 115. The right to effective judicial protection therefore requires that the judges direct the process in such a way that undue delays and hindrances do not lead to impunity, thus frustrating adequate and due protection of human rights. 116. With respect to the extinguishment invoked with respect to an ongoing case under domestic law (supra 106.a and 107.a), this Court has stated that extinguishment provisions or any other domestic legal obstacle that attempts to impede the investigation and punishment of those responsible for human rights 69 Cf., Juan Humberto Sánchez Case, supra note 4, para. 110; Bámaca Velásquez Case, supra note 30, para. 172; and “Street Children” Case (Villagrán Morales at al.). November 19, 1999 Judgment. Series C No. 63, paras. 144-145. Likewise, General Comment No. 6 (Sixteenth session, 1982), para. 3, supra note 123; María Fanny Suárez de Guerrero v. Colombia. Brief No. R.11/45 (February 5, 1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) in 137 (1982), page 137. 70 Cf., Juan Humberto Sánchez Case, supra note 4, para. 144; Bámaca Velásquez Case, supra note 30, para. 212; and “Street Children” Case (Villagrán Morales at al.), supra note 69, para. 226. 71 Cf., Juan Humberto Sánchez Case, supra note 4, para. 144; Bámaca Velásquez Case, supra note 30, para. 212; and “Street Children” Case (Villagrán Morales at al.), supra note 69, para. 226. 72 Cf., Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case, supra note 5, paras. 142 to 144; Suárez Rosero Case. November 12, 1997 Judgment. Series C No. 35, paras. 71 and 72; and Genie Lacayo Case. January 29, 1997 Judgment. Series C No. 30, para. 77.