7 loses his or her spouse becomes a widow or widower, and one who loses a father or a mother becomes an orphan, languages (other than Hebrew) have no similar term to refer to the father or mother who loses a son or daughter. The only term that refers to this situation (in Hebrew) translates into “the idea of a dejectedness of the soul.”27 25. This semantic gap is due to the intensity of this grief, which makes the languages avoid giving it a name; grief in certain situations is so intense and unbearable that they "have no name for it".28 It is as if no one dared to describe the condition suffered by those persons. In the conceptual framework of what is called – perhaps inadequately- “reparations,” we face a truly irreparable damage. Restitutio in integrum is impossible with respect to violation not only of the fundamental right to life but also, in my view, of other human rights such as the right to humane treatment.29 Under circumstances such as those being considered here –among many othersreparations for human rights violations only provide the victims the means to attenuate their suffering, making it less unbearable, perhaps bearable. 26. Aeschylus evoked, precisely, “learning through suffering” (to which the chorus refers in his Agamemnon.30) Reparations thus maintain their significance (cf. infra). They help the survivors live with their grief. And this is a learning process that is renewed every day –but this learning also has its limits. Tragedies, which have survived rationalism, express regret for inhumane treatment and the resulting waste; in tragedies, there is no way to avoid responsibility, and there are no means of compensation.31 Nevertheless, tragedies are also concerned with the need for justice,32 and, from early on, they have also entailed a certain ritual to honor the deceased.33 III. Reparatio: The Reaction and Intervention of the Law 27. What is the role of the Law in these borderline situations? Who could have foreseen that, when he left his home to attend a music concert, youth Walter David were held from the early days of the Court until then. For this reason, in closing it, I announced: -“as of the moment I strike the mallet, this room will no longer be a courtroom and it will become part of the history of this Court” (I-ACtHR, Transcripción de la Audiencia Pública..., op. cit. supra n. (1), p. 56). This first great chapter of the history of the functioning of the Court could hardly have had a more moving and appropriate closing than said public hearing in the Bulacio case. 27 . Cf. IACtHR, Transcripción de la Audiencia Pública..., op. cit. supra n. (1), pp. 15 and 23 (internal circulation). 28 . Ibid., p. 23 (expert opinion of psychologist Graciela Guilis). 29 . A survivor of torture, for example, will never be the same person. 30 . Verse 178. 31 . G. Steiner, The Death of Tragedy, London, Faber, 1961, pp. 128-129, 193 and 354. 32 . A central theme in Aeschylus’ considerations in Eumenides:one knows the rules, then one must “transform them into justice” (verse 587); and of Euripides’ reflection in his Hecuba, obsessed by the idea of justice (verses 349-350, 1115, 1130-1134, and 1371). 33 . G. Steiner, op. cit. supra n. (31), p. 355.