2 and the Tokyo Rules. On the other hand, this synthesis “would include the basic demands of the guarantee-based approach: the rights and guarantees of minors,” which are also reflected, with the liveliest interest, in those international instruments that express the current status of this matter (paras. 24 and 25). 6. The Judgment in the Bulacio vs. Argentina Case mentions the acknowledgment of responsibility by the State and the agreement for a friendly settlement signed on February 26, 2003 by the State, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the representatives of the next of kin of the victim. These are two converging juridical acts, related to each other, although their nature is different and each one has specific legal consequences. We should highlight that the Judgment states that said agreement constitutes “a positive contribution to the development of these proceedings and to effectiveness of the principles that inspire the American Convention on Human Rights” (para. 37). Previously, the State adopted a similar position in another contentious matter (Cf. ICHR, Garrido and Baigorria Case, February 2, 1996 Judgment. Series C No. 26, and Reparations (Art. 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), August 27, 1998 Judgment. Series C No. 39). For this reason, in the instant Judgment “[t]he Court highlights the goodwill shown by the State of Argentina before this Court [...] which demonstrates the commitment of the State to respect for and effective exercise of human rights” (para. 37). 7. Acknowledgment of international responsibility encompasses the facts and claims and determines conclusion of the dispute regarding the merits –unless this Court decides otherwise, based on the authority granted to it by Article 54 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has not occurred in the instant case- and makes it possible to proceed with the establishment of certain consequences of the facts, as this Judgment does. On the other hand, it is possible to assume that two procedural concepts coincide in an acknowledgment of responsibility, both of them with material repercussions, bearing in mind the scope of said recognition: confession and acquiescence. In point of fact, as stated by Alcalá-Zamora, acquiescence is “an act of disposition, or a waiver of rights:” a renunciation of the right to legal defense (El allanamiento en el proceso penal, EJEA, Buenos Aires, 1962, pp. 129 and ff.). “[C]onfession refers to factual statements and acquiescence refers to legal claims” (Proceso, autocomposición y autodefensa (Contribución al estudio de los fines del proceso), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 3d ed., Mexico, 1991, p. 96). 8. Nevertheless, for purposes of this case it has been enough for the Court to accept the acknowledgment of responsibility made by the State –set forth in the agreement between the parties and corroborated at the public hearing held by the Court- regarding violation of the various provisions of the American Convention that were mentioned specifically and that include, among others, the right to humane treatment and to life: Articles 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 25. Logically, acknowledgment of responsibility means that the State considers that there were, in fact, behaviors of its agents that breached the rights of the victim regarding points such as humane treatment and the right to life. Non-fulfillment of the duty of custody, acknowledged by the State –to which I will refer again, below, paras. 22-24, when I discuss the role of the State as guarantor with respect to persons subject to its jurisdiction and immediate control-, can encompass various behaviors that, both by action and by omission, breach juridical rights set forth in the Convention: a breach that encompasses, for example, humane treatment and the right to life.